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 1 
Summary 
The aim of this thesis is to explore the status of the immunity afforded to 
heads of state for serious international crimes. The central question asked is 
whether heads of state at the present time can commit international crimes 
and still be granted impunity. 
The concept of head of state immunity developed from immunity afforded to 
states and is based on the principles of state-sovereignty and equality 
between states. Until the middle of last century such immunity was absolute. 
Thereafter, the rationale for the immunity shifted to a theory of functional 
necessity and was instead determined in accordance with diplomatic 
immunity. Diplomats are entitled to immunity for acts while in office, but 
can be held responsible in certain circumstances after leaving office. This 
distinction between immunities afforded to serving or former state officials 
have resulted in two types of immunity; personal immunity and functional 
immunity. The former is title-based and attached to the official position. The 
latter is conduct-based and attached to the act performed and therefore 
becomes relevant only after the state official leaves office. The extent of 
these immunities with regards to heads of state is determined by customary 
international law. 
Customary international law provides that serving heads of state enjoy 
personal immunity before national courts of other states for all acts. The 
concept of functional immunity afforded to former heads of state is more 
complex. It is clear that functional immunity does not provide protection for 
private acts, but serious international crimes are not private acts. Despite 
international practice indicating the contrary, it is held in this thesis that the 
functional immunity of former heads of state is intact, unless removed in 
case of an exception to the customary rule providing immunity. Such an 
exception might be that the home state of the head of state waives the 
immunity or that it enters into an international agreement which removes the 
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immunity between the contracting states.  The conclusion is that foreign 
domestic courts provide limited possibilities to fight impunity. 
International ad hoc tribunals and hybrid courts are more effective for the 
prosecution of heads of state for serious international crimes. In case the 
tribunal or court is established by the Security Council acting under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter, the immunity afforded to both serving and former 
heads of state is removed. In case the court or tribunal is established by an 
agreement, without the powers of the UN Security Council, the functional 
immunity of a former head of state can still be removed when the statute of 
the court contain a clause establishing the irrelevance of official capacity. In 
this thesis it is held that the personal immunity provides protection for 
serving heads of state despite such a clause, although there is case law 
suggesting the contrary. Because of this, and since the jurisdiction of ad hoc 
tribunals and hybrid courts are often limited to specific regions and to 
specific periods of time, they are not available as a universal solution to end 
impunity. 
The ICC is based on a treaty, the Rome Statute, removing the immunity of 
both serving and former heads of state of the state parties. Also, the Security 
Council can refer situations to the ICC while acting under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter. Under such a referral, the ICC has universal jurisdiction and 
the immunity of both serving and former heads of state of non-party states is 
also removed. Under the principle of complementarity, a case is only 
admissible to the ICC if a state is unwilling or unable to genuinely 
investigate or prosecute the responsible head of state. Also, a Security 
Council referral is only possible in case all of the five permanent members 
abstain from their veto powers. This limits the power and effectiveness of 
the ICC in the fight against impunity. 
The conclusion of this thesis is that present heads of state in many 
circumstances still can commit serious international crimes and invoke 
immunity. But important steps against impunity have been taken in recent 
years, signaling that there might be an end to impunity in the future. 
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Sammanfattning 
Syftet med uppsatsen är att utforska och behandla statschefers rätt till 
immunitet vid grova folkrättsbrott. Den centrala frågan för uppsatsen är om 
statschefer idag kan begå brott mot folkrätten och ändå beviljas straffrihet. 
Immunitet för statschefer har utvecklats ur immuniteten för stater, som är 
baserad på att varje stat är suverän och likställd med andra stater. Fram till 
mitten av nittonhundratalet var immuniteten för statschefer absolut. Efter 
den tidpunkten förändrades staters behov för immunitet och immuniteten för 
statschefer motiverades istället utfrån en teori om ett funktionellt behov, 
med modellen för diplomatisk immunitet som utgångspunkt. Diplomatiska 
företrädare åtnjuter immunitet i den mottagande staten, men kan under vissa 
förutsättningar hållas ansvariga för sina handlingar när de avslutat sin 
tjänstgöring. Denna distinktion mellan immunitet som åtnjuts av sittande 
och före detta representanter för staten har resulterat i två skilda typer av 
immunitet; personlig immunitet och funktionell immunitet. Den förra är 
titelbaserad och knuten till den officiella positionen inom staten. Den senare 
är handlingsbaserad och knuten till själva handlingen och dess officiella 
karaktär, och blir därför relevant först efter avslutad tjänstgöring. 
Omfattningen  av dessa två slags immuniteter bestäms utifrån internationell 
sedvanerätt. 
Internationell sedvanerätt visar att sittande statschefer är berättigade till 
personlig immunitet för alla handlingar, både officiella och privata, inför 
andra staters nationella domstolar. Situationen för funktionell immunitet, 
som åtnjuts av före detta statschefer, är mer komplex och ger skydd för 
officiella handlingar som kan tillskrivas staten, men inte för privata 
handlingar. Grova folkrättsbrott är inte att se som privata handlingar. Trots 
viss rättspraxis som indikerar motsatsen argumenteras det i denna uppsats 
för att den funktionella immunitet som åtnjuts av före detta statschefer är 
intakt inför andra staters nationella domstolar, om den inte undanröjs på 
grund av ett undantag till den sedvanerättsliga regel som erbjuder 
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immunitet. Ett sådant undantag kan exempelvis vara att hemstaten upphäver 
immuniteten eller att staten ingått ett internationellt avtal som underkänner 
möjligheten att hävda immunitet. Slutsatsen är att andra staters nationella 
domstolar ger begränsade möjligheter att bekämpa straffrihet för statschefer. 
Internationella ad hoc-tribunaler och hybrid-domstolar har visat sig mer 
effektiva för åtal av statschefer vid grova folkrättsbrott. Om tribunalen eller 
domstolen upprättats av FN:s säkerhetsråd i enlighet med kapitel VII i FN-
Stadgan i syfte att bevara internationell fred och säkerhet avlägsnas 
möjligheten att invända immunitet för både sittande och före detta 
statschefer.  Om domstolen istället har upprättats genom ett internationellt 
avtal, utan befogenhet från FN:s säkerhetsråd, kan före detta statschefers rätt 
att invända funktionell immunitet fortfarande nekas om domstolens stadga 
innehåller en klausul som fastslår att den åtalades officiella status saknar 
betydelse. I denna uppsats framförs att personlig immunitet ger skydd för 
sittande statschefer trots en sådan klausul, även om det finns rättspraxis som 
tyder på motsatsen. I tillägg, eftersom ad hoc-tribunalers och hybrid-
domstolars jurisdiktion normalt är begränsad till vissa regioner och vissa 
tidsperioder, är inte dessa tillgängliga som en universell lösning för att 
uppnå ett slut på straffriheten för statschefer. 
Den internationella brottsmålsdomstolen (ICC) etablerades genom 
Romstadgan efter ratificering av 60 stater. Stadgan nekar rätt till immunitet 
för både sittande och före detta statschefer för de stater som ratificerat 
stadgan. Dessutom kan FN:s säkerhetsråd, under FN-stadgans kapitel VII, 
hänskjuta situationer till ICC om de utgör ett hot mot internationell fred och 
säkerhet. Därigenom får ICC universell jurisdiktion och rätten till immunitet 
för både sittande och före detta statschefer avlägsnas även för stater som inte 
ratificerat Romstadgan. I enlighet med komplementaritetsprincipen har ICC 
möjlighet att agera endast när en stat är ovillig eller oförmögen att utreda 
och lagföra den ansvariga personen. I tillägg är en hänskjutning från FN:s 
säkerhetsråd endast möjlig om alla de fem permanenta medlemmarna avstår 
från sin vetorätt. Dessa faktorer begränsar ICC’s effektivitet och möjligheter 
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i kampen mot straffrihet för statschefer som gjort sig skyldiga till 
folkrättsbrott. 
Slutsatsen i denna uppsats är att statschefer idag i många fall fortfarande kan 
begår grova folkrättsbrott och ändå åberopa immunitet. Men viktiga steg 
mot straffrihet för statschefer har ändå tagits under senare år, vilket indikerar 
att det någon gång i framtiden möjligen kan bli ett slut på straffrihet för 
statschefer vid grova brott mot folkrätten.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
"In the prospect of an international criminal court lies the promise of 
universal justice. That is the simple and soaring hope of this vision. We 
are close to its realization. We will do our part to see it through til the 
end. We ask you [. . .] to do yours in our struggle to ensure that no ruler, 
no State, no junta and no army anywhere can abuse human rights with 
impunity. Only then will the innocents of distant wars and conflicts know 
that they, too, may sleep under the cover of justice; that they, too, have 
rights, and that those who violate those rights will be punished."   
Those words of hope for universal justice were expressed by the former 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan during a speech to the International Bar 
Association in New York on 11
 
June 1997. The words expressed an 
intention that no one, not even a head of state, should go unpunished after 
committing a serious international crime following the establishment of a 
permanent international court.  
The International Criminal Court (ICC) was established five years later on 1 
July 2002 by the entry into force of the Rome Statute, following the 
ratification by the necessary 60 states.
 1
 Within a year, the Court was fully 
operational. As of today, with the ratification of Palestine on 2 January 
2015, a total of 123 states have ratified the Rome Statute. This raises the 
question, have heads of state in charge of international crimes been prosecuted 
since the establishment of the ICC, or do they still enjoy impunity? 
The question contains allegations, that heads of state have been responsible 
in the past and that they have been granted impunity. However, the 
allegations are not unfounded. Although the respect for human rights was 
realized in large parts of the world during the 20
th
 century, it was also 
gravely violated in others. Following the Second World War, and the 
establishment of the United Nations, the world vowed that the atrocities that 
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took place 1939-1945 should never happen again. But history shows us that 
similar horrendous events did in fact not cease. Sudan, Indonesia, Chile, 
Nigeria, Uganda, Cambodia, Congo, the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda are 
examples of locations where crimes against human rights took place during 
the last century. Few heads of state were held responsible for their 
involvement in the events that took place. Customary international law has 
afforded heads of state with immunity from prosecution, even for serious 
international crimes. 
Attempts have however been made to hold the highest state officials 
responsible for their actions, sometimes with success. At the end of the last 
century some states, such as Belgium, adopted progressive legislation for 
international crimes and issued international arrest warrants claiming 
universal jurisdiction. International tribunals, such as the International 
Criminal Tribunals of Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, were created by the 
United Nations to ensure that international peace and security could be 
maintained and restored. 
While acknowledging the efforts to bring the responsible leaders to justice 
through such measures, a reasonable question might still be to ask why these 
measures are necessary. What is the background and rationale for granting 
the responsible heads of state immunity for serious international crimes, 
such as genocide, war crimes and torture?  
Today, in 2015, thirteen years after the Rome Statute entered into force, this 
thesis will be used to investigate the current status of head of state immunity 
before domestic courts, international tribunals and the ICC. By doing so, the 
thesis aims to answer the following question: can a head of state in 2015 
commit a serious international crime and still be granted impunity? 
 
                                                                                                                            
1
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UNTS, vol. 2187, p. 90. Available at: 
http://legal.un.org/icc/statute/99_corr/cstatute.htm (2015-05-25).  
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1.2 Purpose and questions 
The purpose of this thesis is to explain the concept of head of state 
immunity, to conclude the current status of head of state immunity in 
international law and to answer the question whether impunity still exists in 
2015. In order to be able to do so, this thesis needs to answer a number of 
questions on the way. 
- What is the history and rationale for head of state immunity? 
- Does a head of state enjoy immunity from jurisdictions of national 
courts and/or international tribunals? 
- What is the status of immunity for heads of state before the ICC? 
1.3 Limitations and clarifications 
This thesis will discuss the immunities of heads of state in relation to 
criminal proceedings for international crimes, before international courts 
and tribunals as well as foreign national courts. Hence, it will not discuss 
immunities of heads of state before their own national courts, since such 
rules are governed by national law.  
Throughout this thesis the terms head of state and high state official will 
mainly be used. However, the highest executive of a state and the title used by 
the person holding the position are of course dependent on each state’s 
constitution. They may be presidents, prime ministers, other heads of 
governments, military leaders etc. By using head of state or high state official it 
is meant to include all such positions that might be the highest executive of the 
state, the de facto head of state. Further, as the thesis will show, immunities 
afforded to heads of state can also extend to other high officials of the state, 
such as foreign ministers. 
 
1.4 Material and outline 
Since the concept of head of state immunity to a large extent is based on 
customary international law, as risen from state practice and opinion juris, 
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relevant case law will be used throughout the thesis. But the cases, as well as 
the theory of head of state immunity, have also been discussed by many 
legal scholars. This thesis will therefore examine legal literature and articles 
on the subject matter. Also, international conventions and other 
codifications relevant for the topic of the thesis will be investigated as well. 
The outline of the thesis is based on the relatively wide scope of the topic 
chosen.  Following the introduction in chapter one, chapter two will describe 
the history and theory of head of state immunity. The third chapter will 
describe and analyse the status of head of state immunity before foreign 
national jurisdictions. The fourth chapter will describe and analyse the status 
of head of state immunity before international tribunals and courts prior to 
the establishment of the ICC. The fifth chapter will describe and analyse the 
status of head of state immunity before the jurisdiction of the ICC. Finally, 
in the sixth and final chapter some conclusions on the previous chapters will 
be presented, as well as an analysis of the situation and challenges to the 
ICC and to the fight against impunity. 
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2 Head of state immunity in 
international law 
2.1 Introduction 
The question of head of state immunity is relevant to consider in three 
contexts, and a different law applies to each of them. These three are 
national proceedings against an own former or serving head of state, 
national proceedings against a foreign former or sitting head of state, and 
international proceedings against a former or sitting head of state.
2
 As 
mentioned in chapter 1.3 on limitations and clarifications, the law regulating 
a state’s ability to prosecute its own former or sitting head of state is 
regulated by national law and procedures and will not be dealt with in this 
thesis. In this chapter the thesis will instead investigate to what extent head 
of state immunity is a bar to jurisdiction for international crimes before 
foreign national courts. 
Before head of state immunity is discussed further, there will be a short 
presentation of the immunities afforded to states in general. The purpose is 
to create a background for later discussions, since head of state immunity is 
derived from the wider area of state immunity. 
2.2 State Immunity 
The underlying reasons for the rule of state immunity are said to be the 
concepts of sovereignty, equality and non-interference.
3
 State immunity is 
inherent in an international legal order consisting of equal states independent 
in their exercise of power over a certain territory.
4
 The rule of state 
                                                 
2
 Bassiouni, M. C., Introduction to International Criminal Law: Second Revised Edition 
(2013), p. 73.  
3
 Shaw, M. N., International Law, Fourth edition (2002), p. 491. 
4
 Van Alebeek, R, The Immunity of States and Their Officials in International Criminal 
Law and International Human Rights Law (2008), p. 12.   
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immunity is expressed in the principle par in parem non habet imperium
5
 
which explains that an equal has no power over another equal. Instead, it is 
the sovereign state that has jurisdiction over its territory and its citizens. No 
state may therefore claim superiority or exercise jurisdiction over another 
state, and foreign states therefore enjoy immunity from the jurisdiction of 
the domestic courts of other states, regardless of the circumstances.
6
 A 
consequence of this theory of absolute state immunity is that all acts of a 
state are granted immunity by the domestic courts of other states, and this 
was accepted and upheld by most states until the 19
th
 century.
7
 
The absolute immunity approach was expressed in the case The Schooner 
Exchange v. M’Fadden8 from 1812. The background of the case is that the 
French navy had seized the schooner Exchange, owned by two U.S. 
nationals. After a storm the schooner (then renamed Balaou) had sought 
shelter in the port of Philadelphia. The two original U.S. owners filed a 
claim before a U.S. court to the right of ownership to the ship. However, 
eventually the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed the claim and granted France 
immunity. The Court relied on an implied consent of states to exempt from 
jurisdiction where the sovereignty of another state was implicated. The case 
is generally held to be the first judicial expression of the rule of foreign state 
immunity.
9
 
When the theory of absolute immunity was the prevailing approach, no 
distinction, in this aspect, was made between governmental acts (acta jure 
imperii) and commercial acts (acta jure gestionis).
10
 However, in the 19
th
 
century a more restrictive immunity approach arose and started to be 
adopted by many states.
11
 Some European states, such as Italy and Belgium, 
had begun to permit exercise of jurisdiction over non-sovereign acts.
12
 The 
                                                 
5
 The author of this maxim is Bartolus de Sassoferato in Tractatus Repressalium (1354). 
6
 Shaw, supra 3, p. 494. 
7
 Van Alebeek, supra 4, p. 13. 
8
 The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 US (7Cranch) 116 (Supreme Court, 1812). 
9
 Van Alebeek, supra 4, p. 22. 
10
 Shaw, supra 3, p. 494. 
11
 Fox, The Law of State Immunity (2002), p. 21f. 
12
 Shaw, supra 3, p. 496f. 
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reason was that the increase of states participating in commercial and 
trading activities had made a change necessary and that it would render 
states unjust business advantages if they were immune from the jurisdiction 
of foreign states’ courts.13 The rationale was that state immunity should only 
be granted in matters when it was necessary for the states to fulfil their 
functions. Eventually, an increasing number of states started to adopt this 
restrictive immunity approach. In 1950, in a comprehensive survey of state 
practice in the case of Dralle v. Republic of Czechoslovakia
14
, the Supreme 
Court of Austria concluded that the classic doctrine of absolute immunity 
was no longer a rule of international law, although some countries such as 
the U.K. and the U.S. still applied it. 
After this change of perspective a distinction had to be made between a 
state’s governmental and commercial acts, i.e. acts for which it could enjoy 
immunity and acts for which it could not. According to Fox, this distinction 
is crucial to the present law of state immunity.
15
 Although the distinction is 
theoretical, governmental or sovereign acts are characterized by the fact that 
they are exercised by the sovereign powers of a state, and commercial or 
non-sovereign acts are performed by the state as a person or trader.
16
 
However, such a distinction has been criticised since it could be argued that 
any state act is carried out for public purposes.
17
 Even so, the rule of 
restrictive immunity is today accepted as the prevailing one.
18
 This is 
amongst others shown in the European Convention on State Immunity 1972
19
 
and the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States 
and their Property 2004,
20
 which both list exceptions to state immunity.  
                                                 
13
 Shaw, supra 3, p. 491. 
14
 Dralle v. Republic of Czechoslovakia, 17 ILR 155 (Supreme Court, 1950). 
15
 Fox, supra 11, p. 22. 
16
 Ibid. 
17
 Bröhmer, J., State Immunity and the Violation of Human Rights (1997), p. 19. 
18
 Shaw, supra 3, p. 499. However, some states such as China and Cuba still support the 
absolute immunity approach.  
19
 Available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/074.htm (2015-05-25). 
20
 Available at http://www.un.org/law/jurisdictionalimmunities/index.html (2015-05-25). It 
was adopted by the UN General Assembly through Res. 59/38 of 16 December 2004, but 
has yet to enter into force. 
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This thesis will not look further into the differences between governmental 
and commercial acts since such a task would be too comprehensive and not 
within the direct scope of this thesis. However, there is a similar parallel to 
be found regarding the closely related concept of head of state immunity. 
When looking at immunity for heads of state a similar distinction might be 
required regarding acts performed in an official or private capacity. 
2.3 Basis for head of state immunity 
The head of state is the prime representative of the state and international 
law confers capacity on the head of state to act on behalf of the state.
21
 
Because of this importance for the proper functioning of the state, the notion 
of head of state immunity emerged as a personal protection from the 
jurisdiction of foreign states. However, according to international law, the 
immunity is not vested in the head of state personally, it belongs to the 
state.
22
 It is the independence of the state and the protection of the ability of 
its prime representative to carry out international functions that prevent one 
state from exercising jurisdiction over the head of another state, without the 
latter’s consent.23 
The justification for head of state immunity can historically be divided into 
two main groups, the representative character theory and the functional 
necessity theory, where the latter developed from the former.
24
 
2.3.1 Theories of representative character and functional 
necessity 
The representative character theory originates from the days when the 
sovereign in person was very close to the state, as expressed by the French 
17
th
 century King Louis XIV: “L´Etat c´est moi!”.25 According to the theory, 
                                                 
21
 Fox, supra 11, p. 427. 
22
 Watts, A. The Legal Position in International Law of Heads of States, Heads of 
Governments and Foreign Ministers, Recueil des Cours, vol. 247 (1994), p. 35. 
23
 Fox, supra 11, p. 427. 
24
 Barker, J. C., International Law and International Relations (2000), p. 164. 
25
 Watts, supra 22, p. 35. 
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the immunity is to be traced to the sovereignty of the state.
26
  In conjunction 
with the previously mentioned par in parem non habet imperium, that an 
equal has no power over another equal, this theory formed the foundation 
upon which the early rules of head of state immunity rested.
27
 
 As a development from the representative character theory, the functional 
necessity theory emerged during the last century.
28
 It is based on the 
rationale that heads of state need immunity from the jurisdiction of other 
states in order to be able to conduct their work. The immunity in itself is tied 
to the act performed, not to the individual performing it.
29
 The theory of 
functional necessity is today considered the rationale for head of state 
immunity. 
2.3.2 Parallells to diplomatic immunity 
In early proposals for codifications of immunity afforded to states, such as 
the Institut de Droit International’s Resolution of 1891,30 the immunity of 
heads of state was included in the treatments of states.
31
 This was because of 
the representative character theory, which was the prevailing theory at the 
time. Thereafter, when the theory of functional necessity developed, head of 
state immunity had to be separated from immunity afforded to states. Before 
there was any customary law regulating the issue of immunity of heads of 
state, it was instead determined in accordance with diplomatic immunities.
32
 
Diplomatic immunity was developed on a well-established state practice and 
was justified by the theory of functional necessity, as expressed in the 
preamble of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
33
: 
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 Barker, supra 24, p. 162. 
27
 Watts, supra 22, p. 36. 
28
 Barker, supra 24, p. 164. 
29
 Ibid. 
30
 Projet de règlement international sur la compétence des tribunaux dans les procès contre 
les Etats, souverains ou chefs d'Etat étrangers from 1891. Adopted on 11 September 1891. 
Available at: http://www.idi-iil.org/idiF/resolutionsF/1891_ham_01_fr.pdf (2015-05-25). 
31
 Fox, supra 11, p. 133. 
32
 Watts, supra 22, p. 35. 
33
 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations from 1961, UNTS, vol. 500, p.95. Adopted 
on 18 April 1961. Entered into force on 24 April 1964. Available at: 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_1_1961.pdf (2015-05-25). 
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“the purpose of such privileges and immunities is not to benefit individuals but to ensure 
the efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic missions as representing States.” 
The representation and official capacity of the diplomatic agents was the 
rationale for the diplomatic immunity, and since heads of state are the prime 
representative of the state, it was natural that diplomatic immunities were 
extended to heads of state.
34
 In Art. 39(1), the 1961 Vienna Convention 
provides that the person entitled to immunity enjoys it while in office, and 
Art. 39(2) provides that the immunity normally ceases when the person no 
longer holds office. However, if an act was performed in exercise of official 
functions as a member of the mission, the immunity shall prevail.
35
 This is a 
result from the functional necessity theory, that the immunity is tied to the 
act performed, not to the individual performing it. This principle of 
functional immunity,
36
 established in Article 39 of the 1961 Vienna 
Convention, reflects a rule of customary international law.
37
 
When heading special missions, heads of state are afforded diplomatic 
privileges and immunities in accordance with the Convention on Special 
Missions of 1969
38
. The convention states that the diplomatic staff and 
representatives of the sending state shall enjoy immunity from the criminal 
jurisdiction of the receiving state.
39
 Apart from heads of state, the immunity 
from criminal jurisdiction also includes heads of government as well as 
ministers of foreign affairs and “other persons of high rank‟.
40
 The Convention 
                                                 
34
 Nwosu, U. N., Head of State Immunity in International Law (2011), PhD thesis,  
 Department of Law of the London School of Economics and Political Science, p. 72. 
Available at: http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/599/ (2015-05-25). 
35
 Article 39(2): “When the functions of a person enjoying privileges and immunities have 
come to an end, such privileges and immunities shall normally cease at the moment when 
he leaves the country, or on expiry of a reasonable period in which to do so, but shall 
subsist until that time, even in case of armed conflict. However, with respect to acts 
performed by such a person in the exercise of his functions as a member of the mission, 
immunity shall continue to subsist.” 
36
 See further in chapter 2.4 on ‘functional immunity’.  
37
 Van Alebeek, supra 4, p. 225. 
38
 Convention on Special Missions from 1969, UNTS, vol. 1400, p. 231. Adopted on 8 
December 1969. Entered into force on 21 June 1985. Available at: 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_3_1969.pdf (2015-05-25). 
39
 Article 31(1): “The representatives of the sending State in the special mission and the 
members of its diplomatic staff shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the 
receiving State. “ 
40
 1969 Convention on Special Missions, Art. 21. 
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further states immunity from criminal jurisdiction for both private and 
official acts. However, similar to Art 39(2) of the 1961 Vienna Convention, 
Art 43(2) provides that when the functions of a member of the special 
mission have come to an end, the immunity shall normally cease. But, if an 
act was performed by a person in exercise of his functions as a member of 
the mission, the immunity shall prevail. 
Another convention to be noted is the 1973 Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, 
including Diplomatic Agents.
41
Article 1(1)(a) of the convention defines 
"Internationally protected persons" which includes "a Head of State, 
including any member of a collegial body performing the functions of a 
Head of State under the constitution of the State concerned, a Head of 
Government or a Minister for Foreign Affairs, whenever any such person is 
in a foreign State[…]". Even though the convention deals with protection of 
crimes against diplomatic agents and heads of state, not acts or crimes 
performed by such persons, it is apparent that there has been a history of 
affording similar rights to heads of state as to diplomatic agents. 
However, although there are considerable influences of diplomatic immunity 
on the immunity afforded to heads of state, the current theory of head of state 
immunity cannot be said to be founded upon diplomatic immunity.
42
 Both 
diplomatic immunity and head of state immunity are today instead to be 
regarded as different aspects of the wider concept of state immunity.
43
 
Notwithstanding this, some parts of diplomatic law, such as the provisions 
of the 1961 Vienna Convention, must be said to be relevant to some aspects 
of the position of heads of state.
44
 That connection will be discussed in the 
chapters to come. 
                                                 
41
 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally 
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2.4 Different features of head of state immunity 
Under international law, two diverse concepts of immunity are often 
identified: personal immunity (or immunity rationae personae)
45
 and 
functional immunity (or immunity rationae materiae)
46
.
47
 Although this 
conceptual distinction between personal and functional immunity has been 
questioned,
48
 it now seems to be widely accepted as part of customary 
international law.
49
 In fact, making a distinction between these two features 
of immunity is vital for understanding head of state immunity. The concepts 
of these two types of immunity will be given brief explanations below, but 
will be discussed in more detail in chapter 3 when the status of international 
state practice is examined. 
2.4.1 Personal immunity 
Personal immunity is immunity from the jurisdiction of foreign national 
courts enjoyed by a limited group of state officials because of their official 
status of the state.
50
 The rules are first and foremost applicable to heads of 
state and diplomatic agents, and recognize the inviolability of such persons. 
However, it has also been extended to include other official functions such 
as ministers of foreign affairs.
51
 The rationale behind personal immunity is 
the functioning of international relations since state officials need to be able 
to work and travel as part of their official function. 
                                                 
45
 Sometimes also referred to as procedural immunity. 
46
 Sometimes also referred to as substantive immunity. 
47
 Cassese, A., Acquaviva, G., Fan, M. and Whiting, A., International Criminal Law: Cases 
& Commentary (2011), p. 76. 
48
 The distinction was not upheld by the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant case of 14 February 
2002. The case will be discussed further in Chapter 3. 
49
 A general acceptance of the distinction between the two types of immunity appears from 
the ILC’s Report of the 60th session (2008), A/63/10, para. 287: “It was generally agreed 
that a distinction could be drawn between two types of immunity of State officials: 
immunity ratione personae and immunity ratione materiae. Some members underlined the 
importance of these concepts to differentiate the status of high-ranking and other State 
officials, and that of incumbent and former officials.”. 
50
 Van Alebeek, supra 4, p. 158. 
51
 See further the Arrest Warrant case in Chapter 3. 
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Personal immunity was imported from diplomatic law to apply to heads of 
state.
52
 As a reference, Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations 1961
53
 (Vienna Convention), which is a codification of customary 
international law, states: “The person of a diplomatic agent shall be 
inviolable. He shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention.” Article 
31 further provides: “A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the 
criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State.”. Although derived from 
diplomatic law, personal immunity afforded to heads of state is now 
commonly accepted.
54
 
It should be pointed out that personal immunity relates to procedural law and 
assures the state official a procedural defence from criminal proceedings in 
another state.
55
 It is not a judgement on the lawfulness of the official’s 
conduct. Individual criminal responsibility and immunity are quite different 
concepts.
56
 In fact, the sheer purpose of personal immunity is to protect 
individuals from the jurisdiction of other states regarding acts for which the 
individual is responsible.
57
 
2.4.2  Functional immunity 
Functional immunity is immunity from the jurisdiction of foreign national 
courts enjoyed by state officials because of the official character of the act 
itself.
58
 It is grounded on the notion that a state official is not accountable to 
other states for acts performed as part of their official capacity and that such 
acts instead must be attributed to the state.
59
 As opposed to personal 
immunity, it is conduct-based rather than title-based. And since functional 
immunity attaches to the act instead of the state official, it may be relied on 
                                                 
52
 Watts, supra 22, p. 61. 
53
 Available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1964/06/19640624%2002-
10%20AM/Ch_III_3p.pdf. 
54
 Van Alebeek, supra 4, p. 169. 
55
 Cassese, A. When May Senior State Officials Be Tried for International Crimes? Some 
Comments on the Congo v. Belgium Case, EJIL (2002), Vol. 13 No. 4, p. 864. 
56
 As pointed out by the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant case, para 60. See further Chapter 3. 
57
 Van Alebeek, supra 4, p. 266. 
58
 Ibid, p. 222. 
59
 Cassese, supra 55, p 862; Van Alebeek, supra 4, p. 239. 
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by all who have acted on behalf of the state.
60
 In a way, it is a mechanism 
for transferring responsibility to the state. This applies also if the official has 
acted ultra vires since international law does not allow states to determine 
whether a state official of a foreign state has acted within his mandate. Such 
judgement is within the exclusive competence of the home state.
61
  
The fact that acts are attached to the state does however not mean that the 
functional immunity is part of the law of state immunity.
62
 But there are 
similarities. Functional immunity also extends to governmental acts and 
commercial acts, unless they were performed in a private capacity. Acts are 
official in nature only when the act is exclusively attributable to the state. 
Since the act is regarded as performed by the state, functional immunity 
relates to substantive law and assures the state official a substantive defence 
from criminal proceedings in another state. As a logical consequence, the 
immunity survives the term of the official functions of the representative.
63
 
Moreover, the functional immunity applies erga omnes, and not only 
between the receiving and the sending state.
 64
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3 Head of state immunity 
before national jurisdictions 
3.1 Introduction 
There are several cases involving head of state immunity before domestic 
courts for crimes outside the group of serious international crimes within the 
scope of this thesis. As an example, in the French judgement concerning the 
Libyan president Gaddafi,
65
 who was indicted for his role in the destruction 
of a French civilian aircraft (Lockerbie) in 1988, the Cour de Cassation 
concluded that international custom opposes that heads of state in office can 
be subject to prosecution before the criminal jurisdiction of a foreign state. 
Therefore, the Court concluded that Gaddafi was entitled to personal 
immunity from prosecution.
66
 
However serious a crime of terrorism may be, this thesis will instead focus 
on the relatively few cases where the question of head of state immunity of 
serving or former head of state have been at focus in cases of the most 
serious international crimes, crimes possibly amounting to jus cogens 
international crimes.
67
 To illustrate the status of head of state immunity 
before national jurisdictions this thesis will investigate personal and 
functional immunities separately, i.e. separate the question of head of state 
immunity for a serving head of state and for a former heads of state. 
                                                 
65
 Gaddafi 125 ILR 490 (Court of Appeal & Court of Cassation, 2000, 2002) (Gaddafi 
case). 
66
 Van Alebeek, supra 4, p. 268. 
67
 See further chapter 3.3.4.2 for the definition of “jus cogens international crimes”. 
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3.2 Personal immunity before national 
jurisdictions  
3.2.1 Belgium v. Congo (Arrest Warrant case) 
In the Arrest Warrant case
68
 the ICJ concluded that a serving foreign 
minister shall be granted immunity even from charges of serious 
international crimes. The background of the case was that Belgium in 1999 
had adapted its war crimes legislation to the standards of the Rome Statute 
from 1998, which states the irrelevance of official capacity.
69
 The new 
addition in the Belgian law stated (in translation) that “The immunity 
attributed to the official capacity of a person, does not prevent the 
application of the present Act”. This meant that the new legislation did not 
recognize any immunity.
70
 Under this newly adopted law, and while 
exercising universal jurisdiction, an investigating judge issued an 
international arrest warrant against Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, the 
serving foreign minister of the Republic of Congo. The crimes listed in the 
arrest warrant were war crimes and crimes against humanity. The Republic 
of Congo filed an application with the ICJ complaining that Belgium, by 
issuing the arrest warrant, had violated the personal immunity
71
 of their 
foreign minister, as well as the principle par in parem non habet imperium. 
In its judgement, the ICJ held the immunity from criminal jurisdiction of 
ministers of foreign affairs is absolute for all acts, both private and official: 
“[…] the functions of a Minister of Foreign Affairs are such that […] he or she when 
abroad enjoys full immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability. That immunity and 
that inviolability protects the individual concerned against any act of authority of another 
State which would hinder him or her in performance of his or her duties.”72 
                                                 
68
 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium), Judgement, 
ICJ Reports 2002 3.  
69
 Van Alebeek, supra 4, p. 269. See also Art. 27 of the Rome Statute and chapter 5.5.1 in 
this thesis. 
70
 Ibid, p. 270. 
71
 Interestingly, the Republic of Congo did not refer to immunity for high state officials, but 
turned to the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Immunities. 
72
 Arrest Warrant case, para. 54.  
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The reasoning was that the performance of the official functions would be 
prevented in case a foreign minister was not able to travel freely. The 
question was, however, whether such immunity should be granted even in 
cases of serious international crimes? After having carefully examined state 
practice, including national legislation and decisions of national higher 
courts such as the House of Lords and the French Cour de Cassation, the 
ICJ held that: 
“[…] It has been unable to deduce from this practice that there exists under customary 
international law any form of exception to the rule according immunity from criminal 
jurisdiction and inviolability to incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affaires, when they are 
suspected of having committed war crimes or crimes against humanity.”73 
The conclusion was that the personal immunity of a sitting foreign minister 
is absolute. But the ICJ added in an obiter dictum that the conclusion does 
not represent a bar to criminal prosecution in four different circumstances: 
a) the accused may still be tried in his or her home country, b) the national 
state can waive the right to immunity, c) the person can be tried for private 
acts when no longer in office, and finally, d) the accused may still be tried 
before an international criminal court.
74
  
In conclusion, the ICJ found that the general rule based on customary law 
applies, granting serving foreign ministers immunity from criminal charges 
in foreign states national courts even when serious crimes such as war 
crimes and crimes against humanity are at hand. As such, the Arrest 
Warrant Case is one of the most important cases in defence of personal 
immunity.
75
 And as can be seen below, the findings in the Arrest Warrant 
case, that the personal immunity of a high state official is absolute, are 
confirmed in several foreign national jurisdictions. It can also be pointed out 
that Belgium in 2003, in response to the decision of the ICJ, changed its war 
                                                 
73
 Arrest Warrant Case, para. 58.  
74
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75
 At the same time, it has been argued that the case contains some shortcomings. 
Jurisdiction is a prerequisite to the immunity issue, but the Court did not discuss universal 
jurisdiction prior to the immunity issue. This might however be explained by the fact that 
Congo eventually dropped the argument that Belgium had no jurisdiction. The case also 
only considered the immunity of a serving foreign minister, no other high official functions. 
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crimes legislation to severely restrict the Belgian courts jurisdictions and 
instead fully recognize the personal immunity of heads of state, heads of 
government and ministers of foreign affairs.
76
 
3.2.2 Belgium v. Sharon 
In 2001, a civilian complaint was filed with a Belgian Court against Ariel 
Sharon, the serving prime minister of Israel.
77
 The complaint charged 
Sharon for acts of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, which 
took place in Beirut in 1982. The Belgian Act under which the complaint 
had been filed was the same as in the Arrest Warrant Case. However, in the 
light of the outcome of the Arrest Warrant case, the Belgian Cour de 
Cassation concluded that although the Belgian Act on universal jurisdiction 
did not recognize official status, the Belgian legislation would be in conflict 
with customary international law if would set aside the head of state 
immunity of Ariel Sharon.
78
 Therefore, the case was dismissed by the Court.
 
 
3.2.3 Spain v. Fidel Castro 
Similarly, in 1999, in a Spanish case against Fidel Castro
79
 the Spanish 
Audiencia Nacional in its decision not to extradite Castro concluded that a 
serving head of state has absolute immunity from the criminal jurisdiction 
from foreign courts, even in respect of allegations of crimes against 
international law.
80
  
3.2.4 Tachiona v. Mugabe 
In the 2001 U.S. case of Tachiona v. Mugabe,
81
 the serving president 
Mugabe and foreign minister Mudenge of Zimbabwe faced a class action 
alleging torture and other human rights violations. The suit was brought 
pursuant to the U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), the U.S. Torture 
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Victims Protection Act (TVPA) and international human rights law. The 
U.S. government filed a suggestion to the Court that Mugabe and Mudenge 
were entitled to head of state immunity.
82
 The question before the court was 
whether fundamental human rights of jus cogens status supersede the head of 
state of immunity of Mugabe and Mudenge. However, the Court dismissed the 
class action and upheld Mugabe’s personal immunity, even for private acts. 
3.2.5 Pinochet case (No. 3) 
Further, in the case Pinochet No.3,
83
 although the case concerned a former 
head of state, the British House of Lords concluded that its decision not to 
afford Augusto Pinochet immunity did not affect the immunity of serving 
heads of state, i.e. it did not affect personal immunity.
84
 This case will be 
discussed in further detail in the next chapter. 
3.2.6 United States v. Noriega 
The case United States v. Noriega
85
 is the only national court case where 
personal immunity has been denied to a serving head of state. The case is 
noteworthy, even though it does not involve serious international crimes. 
General Manuel Noriega had been seized by U.S. troops in 1990 and faced 
charges for drug trafficking and money laundry, and Noriega was convicted 
and sentenced to prison. The case does however not conclude that a serving 
head of state is not entitled to invoke immunity. Instead, immunity was not 
accorded on the ground that the US government had never recognized 
Noriega as head of state.
86
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3.2.7 Analysis of personal immunity 
As illustrated by the cases above, there is no question that serving heads of 
state, heads of government and ministers of foreign affairs are granted 
absolute personal immunity from criminal prosecution before foreign 
national jurisdictions, even for grave breaches against international criminal 
law.  The personal immunity applies regardless if the act was performed in a 
private or official capacity. This is also confirmed by the doctrine of leading 
scholars.
87
 
Only the U.S. claims the right to subject serving heads of state to its 
jurisdiction. Even though they acknowledge the concept of head of state 
immunity, they do not recognize that the U.S. jurisdiction can be limited by 
international law in that regard.
88
 In accordance with the so called “Flatow 
Amendment”89 the U.S. courts can withhold head of state immunity in case a 
state is designated “a state sponsor of terrorism”.90 But that is the exception, 
and personal immunity of state officials stands intact before foreign national 
courts, unless it is waived by the state.  
This view of personal immunity as lex lata was also confirmed in 2013 by 
the ILC. After its sixty-fifth session the ILC issued a report
91
 in which it 
adopted three draft articles which confirm that heads of state, heads of 
government, and foreign ministers are entitled to personal immunity from 
foreign criminal jurisdiction for their public or private acts, and that such 
immunity ceases once they leave office.
92
  
                                                 
87
 Fox, supra 11, 430f.; Van Alebeek, supra 4, p. 298, Akande & Shah, supra 60, p. 824. 
88
 Van Alebeek, supra 4, p 273. 
89
 In 1996, the U.S. Congress added a cause of action to modify the FSIA. This amendment 
provided that “[a]n official, employee, or agent of a foreign state designated as a state 
sponsor of terrorism […] while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or 
agency shall be liable to a United States national […] for personal injury or death caused 
by the acts of that official, employee, or agent for which the court of the United States may 
maintain jurisdiction”. Several U.S. district courts have construed the “Flatow 
Amendment” to provide a private right of action against a foreign government. From: 
American International Law Cases Fourth Series: 2009, Vol. 5, p. 1528. 
90
 Van Alebeek, supra 4, p 273. 
91
 ILC 2013 Report, A/68/10. Available at: 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/reports/2013/english/chp5.pdf (2015-05-25). 
92
 “Article 4: Scope of immunity ratione personae 
 27 
The current status of personal immunity does not mean that no exceptions 
may develop in state practice.  If states agree that individual criminal 
responsibility outweighs the interest to protect those responsible, they may 
decide to develop an exception for crimes against international law.
93
 
Investigating such exceptions is one of the topics for the ILC in future 
sessions. Personal immunity is a procedural defence and a change of law can 
only take place by a change in state practice, and as has been illustrated by 
the case law, such a change has not taken place.
94
  
3.3 Functional immunity before national 
jurisdictions 
As was explained above, functional immunity derives from the fact that the 
official act is attributable to the state. As a consequence, crimes against 
international law committed by state officials must be regarded as official 
acts, and the only way to remove the immunity of the official would be 
through a separate rule establishing an exception.
95
 The question is whether 
such an exception exists. The limited customary international law available 
has however been shifting and to some extent inconclusive on the matter. 
3.3.1 Eichmann case 
In the Eichmann case
96
 from 1962, the Supreme Court of Israel denied 
Adolf Eichmann functional immunity on the ground that state officials may 
not escape responsibility in case of international crimes. The case is worth 
mentioning even though Eichmann was not head of state, since it regards 
immunity of a former senior state official and is a landmark in the domestic 
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implementation of international criminal law. Also, functional immunity 
applies to anyone acting on behalf of the state. 
In 1960, Eichmann had been abducted by Israeli agents in Argentina to stand 
trial for his actions during World War II. Charges were brought against 
Eichmann for crimes against the Jewish people (genocide) and crimes 
against humanity under the 1950 Nazis and Nazi Collaborators 
(Punishment) Law.
97
 The main defence by Eichmann was the he only had 
followed orders from his superiors.
98
  
A relevant fact for the outcome of the case is that the UN General Assembly, 
on 11 December 1946 unanimously had adopted Resolution 95 which 
affirmed the principles recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal.
99
  In its judgement, the Supreme Court noted that these principles 
reflected customary international law.
 100
 Article 7 of the Nuremberg Charter 
of the International Military Tribunal state the irrelevance of official 
capacity:  
“The official position of defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible officials in 
Government Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or 
mitigating punishment.” 
Further, the Court explicitly stated that state officials acting in their official 
capacity cannot invoke immunity if they commit a crime against 
international law.
101
 Consequently, Eichmann was not entitled to functional 
immunity for his actions and was sentenced to death and executed by 
hanging on 31 May 1962.
102
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3.3.2 Pinochet case (No. 3) 
In the case Pinochet No.3
103
 the British House of Lords was to answer the 
question whether Pinochet as former head of state of Chile was entitled to 
functional immunity. The background of the case was that Spain in 1985 
had adopted a law introducing the principle of universal jurisdiction for the 
crime of genocide,
104
 and in 1998 a Spanish judge requested that U.K. 
authorities arrest Pinochet in London (where he had come for medical 
treatment) for extradition to Spain. The arrest warrant was based on charges 
of genocide, torture and kidnapping that took place in Chile in the period 
1973-1990, also against Spanish citizens.
105
 The case involves several 
warrants and appeals
106
 and was also complicated by the fact that torture 
committed outside the U.K. was not criminalized under U.K. legislation 
until 29 September 1988, and that the 1989 U.K. Extradition Act contained 
a double criminality rule.
107
 An important factor is also that the 1984 
Torture Convention
108
 was ratified by the U.K. on 8 December 1988. In the 
end, the question before the Lords came to be whether Pinochet was entitled 
to functional immunity for the alleged crimes of torture that had occurred in 
Chile after 29 September 1988. In case he was not entitled to immunity he 
could be extradited to Spain to stand criminal trial.  
By a majority of six to one, the Lords found that Pinochet’s official position 
as head of state did not entitle him to functional immunity. In their 
reasoning, the Lords based their decision on domestic law
109
 which declared 
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that international law regarding diplomatic privileges and relations, the 1961 
Vienna Convention, applied to former heads of state. As explained 
previously in chapter 2.3.2 of this thesis, Art. 39(2) of the convention reflect 
the rule of functional immunity under customary international law, and 
entitle former state officials immunity for official acts, but not for private 
acts. The decision of the Lords contained a conclusion that acts of torture 
were seen as acts performed outside the functions of the official position as 
head of state:  
“Acts of torture and hostage taking, outlawed as they are by international law, cannot be 
attributed to the state to the exclusion of personal liability. It is not consistent with the 
existence of these crimes that former officials, however senior, should be immune from 
prosecution outside their own jurisdictions.”110 
However, the decision was based on several unique specifics of the case and 
although the majority agreed to not entitle Pinochet immunity, their 
reasoning and opinions on several critical issues leading up to the 
conclusion was very diverse.
111
 All seven Lords delivered separate opinions, 
and the conclusions of these are relevant for the evaluation of the 
precedence of the case. 
Lord Saville and Lord Brown-Wilkinson considered that the universal 
jurisdiction over the crimes of torture was established by the ratification of 
the 1984 Torture Convention. Since jurisdiction is a prerequisite to 
immunity, the decision not to afford immunity was therefore dependent on 
the ratification. In the word of Lord Saville: 
“So far as the states that are parties to the convention are concerned, I cannot see how, as 
far as torture is concerned, this immunity can exist consistently with the terms of that 
convention. Each state party has agreed that the other parties can exercise jurisdiction 
over alleged official torturers found within their territories…and thus, to my mind, can 
hardly simultaneously claim an immunity from extradition or prosecution that is 
necessarily based on the official nature of the alleged torture.”112 
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Lord Hope, Lord Philips and Lord Hutton argued that functional immunity 
from criminal jurisdiction cannot be afforded in respect of crimes against 
international law,
113
 but both Lord Hope and Lord Philips still referred to the 
1984 Torture Convention and argued that the obligations of the convention 
were incompatible with functional immunity.
114
 In the words of Lord Hope: 
“In my opinion, once the machinery which it provides was put in place to enable 
jurisdiction over such crimes to be exercised in the courts of a foreign state, it was no 
longer open to any state which was a signatory to the convention to invoke immunity 
ratione materiae in the event of allegations of systematic or widespread torture committed 
after that date being made in the courts of that state against its officials or any other 
person acting in an official capacity.”115  
The Lords decision heavily relied on the 1984 Torture Convention, and not 
all international crimes are supported by a convention granting universal 
jurisdiction.
116
 Also, Art. 1(1) of the 1984 Torture Convention explicitly 
limits torture to acts of “a public official or other person acting in an 
official capacity”.117 These specifics of the case limit the applicability of the 
decision as precedence in cases involving functional immunity for other 
types of international crimes. The decision in the case was not based on any 
general practice recognising the non-applicability of head of state immunity 
for international crimes, it was based on the technicalities of the 1984 
Torture Convention.
118
 The conclusion of the decision of the Lords is that if 
Chile had not been a party to the 1984 Torture Convention,
119
 Pinochet 
would most likely have been granted immunity. However, some scholars 
still argue that the outcome, and especially the separate opinions of Lords 
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Browne-Wilkinson, Hope, Millett and Phillips, is evidence of a customary 
rule that functional immunity cannot excuse international crimes.
120
 
3.3.3 Belgium v. Congo (Arrest Warrant case) 
Although the Arrest Warrant case primarily concerned personal immunity, 
the ICJ formulated its view on functional immunity like this: 
“Provided that it has jurisdiction under international law, a court of one State may try a 
former Minister for Foreign Affairs of another State in respect of acts […] committed 
during that period of office in a private capacity.”121 
The reasoning of the ICJ gives that former state officials are immune from 
criminal jurisdiction if the act is considered an official act, but not if it is 
considered a private act. The statement from the Lords in Pinochet No.3 that 
torture is an act performed outside the functions of the official position as 
head of state seems to suggest a similar conclusion. The question must 
therefore be whether the act was performed by the individual as a part of his 
or her official function? Whether this is the correct interpretation will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
3.3.4 Analysis of functional immunity 
As seen from the cases in the previous chapter, the status of functional 
immunity for former heads of state before national jurisdictions is more 
complex than the status of personal immunity. The cases illustrate that there 
are exceptions to functional immunities in case of serious international 
crimes. Further, the Institut de Droit International, in its Resolution on the 
Immunity from Jurisdiction of the State and of Persons Who Act on Behalf 
of the State in case of International Crimes from 2009 stated in Art. III(1): 
“[n]o immunity from jurisdiction other than personal immunity 
international law applies with regard to international crimes.” This would 
mean that functional immunity does not apply in such cases. 
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Cassese lists an extensive post World War II practice where functional 
immunity has not been upheld, amongst others the Eichmann case and the 
case Pinochet No. 3.
122
 Many of the other cases involve other state officials 
than heads of state, but Cassese argues that it would be odd if a customary 
rule that removes functional immunity would not apply to all state officials 
who commit international crimes.
123
 The same conclusion on the status of 
functional immunity has also been reached by Akande and Shah: 
“There have been a significant number of national prosecutions of foreign state officials 
for international crimes. All of these decisions proceed – at least implicitly (and sometimes 
explicitly) – on the basis of a lack of immunity ratione materiae in respect of such 
crimes.”124 
Different arguments and theories have been suggested as to how to interpret 
and explain the outcomes and conclusions regarding functional immunities 
in case law.
125
 Is the explanation a customary international rule removing 
the immunity, or is there another explanation to be found? It has been 
suggested that the international crime cannot be regarded as an official act of 
a representative of a state. It has also been argued that the jus cogens status 
of certain human rights “trump” the customary rule of functional immunity, 
or that the international crime in itself implies a waiver of the immunity. 
Further, it has been suggested that rules conferring extra-territorial 
jurisdiction may of themselves displace prior immunity rules.
126
 This thesis 
will now look into these explanations to see if it is possible to conclude that 
there exists a separate rule establishing an exception to functional immunity 
in case of serious international crimes. 
                                                 
Cassese, supra 55, p. 870. The cases Cassese refer to are: Eichmann in Israel, Barbie in 
France, Kappler, Priebke in Italy, Rauter, Albrecht and Bouterse in the Netherlands, 
Kesserling before a British Military Court sitting in Venice and von Lewinski (called von 
Manstein) before a British Military Court in Hamburg, Pinochet in the UK, Yamashita in 
the US, Buhler before the Supreme National Tribunal of Poland, Pinochet and Scilingo in 
Spain, Miguel Cavallo in Mexico. 
123
 Cassese, supra 55, p. 871. 
124
 Akande & Shah, supra 60, p. 839. 
125
 Ibid. 
126
 Ibid, p. 817. 
 34 
3.3.4.1 International crimes are not official acts? 
In the obiter dictum of the Arrest Warrant case, the ICJ suggests that 
functional immunity does in fact protect the former heads of state from 
prosecution for international crimes committed while in office. This is a 
consequence of the Court’s conclusion that prosecution would be possible 
“in respect of acts committed during that period of office in a private 
capacity”.127 If prosecution of former heads of state is only possible for 
private acts, then the immunity must be a protection for all official acts. In 
this sense, the conclusion follows the customary rule for diplomatic 
immunity codified in Article 39(2) of the 1961 Vienna Convention. 
If this is correct, international crimes such as genocide, war crimes, torture 
etc., must be regarded as private acts in order for a former head of state to be 
prosecuted. Some of the Lords in the case Pinochet No.3 seem to have 
reasoned in a similar way when concluding that torture could only be 
performed outside the functions of the official position as head of state. In 
the words of Lord Hutton: 
“I do not consider that Senator Pinochet or Chile can claim that the commission of acts of 
torture after 29 September 1988 were functions of the head of state. The alleged acts of 
torture by Senator Pinochet were carried out under colour of his position as head of state, 
but they cannot be regarded as functions of a head of state under international law when 
international law expressly prohibits torture as a measure which a state can employ in any 
circumstances whatsoever and has made it an international crime.”
128
 
Some scholars agree with this theory that international crimes can never be 
regarded as official acts of the state.
129
 However, other scholars argue that 
this distinction is not necessary. Cassese, in his comments to the Arrest 
Warrant case stated that the distinction between official acts and acts 
performed in a private capacity, in this context, is “ambiguous and 
untenable”.130 He concluded: 
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“That international crimes are not as a rule ‘private acts’ seems evident. These crimes are 
seldom perpetrated in such capacity. Indeed, individuals commit such crimes by making 
use (or abuse) of their official status.”
131 
For this reason, Cassese questions the conclusion on functional immunity in 
the Arrest Warrant case.
132
 In case only private acts are not protected by 
functional immunity, and an international crime cannot be a private act, then 
all former heads of state would be granted impunity for international crimes. 
Akande & Shah also consider that the theory that international crimes 
cannot be official acts must be rejected.
133
 They argue that an international 
crime is as much an official act as any other. It is not the legality of the act 
that determines whether it is official or private, it is “the nature of the act as 
well as the context in which it occurred”.134 The same view is shared by 
Watts: 
“A Head of state clearly can commit a crime in his personal capacity; but it seems equally 
clear that he can, in the course of his public functions as Head of state, engage in conduct 
which may be tainted by criminality or other forms of wrongdoing. The critical test would 
seem to be whether the conduct was engaged in under colour of or in ostensible exercise of 
the Head of states public authority. If it was, it must be treated as official conduct, and so 
not a matter subject to the jurisdiction of other states whether or not it was wrongful or 
illegal under the law of his own state.” 
Also, the act of torture, as defined in Art 1(1) of the 1984 Torture 
Convention must be performed by “a public official or other person acting 
in an official capacity”. Acts of torture performed in a private capacity cannot 
be described as torture under the convention. This of course also totally 
contradicts that serious international crimes should be regarded as private 
acts. For the reasons stated above, it is hard to find any bearing in this 
theory. 
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3.3.4.2 Jus cogens international crimes trump functional 
immunity? 
The theory is that a crime against human rights law with jus cogens status 
status (a “jus cogens international crime”), entails obligations erga omnes not 
to grant immunity to former heads of state.
135
 Human rights norms with jus 
cogens status are said to prevail, or “trump”, over other head of state immunity 
since such immunity is merely part of customary international law.
136
 However, 
this view is problematic for several reasons. 
First, there is no generally accepted category of acts amounting to jus cogens 
international crimes. Which acts, if any, would remove head of state immunity? 
The concept of jus cogens is based on an acceptance that some norms are of 
fundamental and superior value within the legal system.
137
 As such, jus cogens 
norms hold the highest position of all legal norms and principles. They are 
peremptory and non-derogable.
138
 The status of jus cogens was first codified 
in Art. 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of treaties,
139
 which 
states:  
“A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory 
norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a 
peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized 
by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no 
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of 
general international law having the same character.” 
Only rules based on custom or treaties that are generally accepted by the 
international law community of states as a whole can become jus cogens, 
therefore their character derives from within international law and from the 
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will of states.
140
 However, there is an uncertainty about which international 
crimes that are of jus cogens character, or the precise effect of that 
characterization.
141
 In fact, in its report to the Vienna Conference, the ILC 
itself acknowledged that: 
“[t]he formulation of the article is not free from difficulty, since there is no simple criterion 
by which to identify a general rule of international law as having the character of jus 
cogens.”142 
In 2001, in its Commentary to the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, the 
ILC gave as examples of jus cogens: the prohibition of aggression, slavery 
and slave trade, genocide, racial discrimination and apartheid, torture, basic 
rules of international law applicable in armed conflicts, and the right to self-
determination.
 143
 
However, the opinions of the leading legal scholars are diverse, and it is not 
at all certain that all of those examples are jus cogens norms. According to 
Brownlie, the least controversial examples of jus cogens are the prohibition 
of the use of force, the law of genocide, the principle of racial non-
discrimination, crimes against humanity, and the rules prohibiting trade in 
slaves and piracy.
144
 But according to Shaw, the jus cogens status is 
controversial even for recognized international crimes such as unlawful use 
of force, genocide, slave trading and piracy.
145
 Based on a strict 
interpretation of the concept of jus cogens, it has also been suggested that 
only the principles underlying basic human rights, such as the principles 
behind the common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
146
 and the 
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1948 Genocide Convention,
147
 can be truly considered jus cogens.
148
 In 
conclusion, the concept of jus cogens international crimes seems generally 
recognized and accepted but it still remains unclear which specific crimes 
that constitute such jus cogens international crimes.  
Besides the problem with establishing the jus cogens international crimes, it 
has been argued that this suggested conflict between jus cogens and state 
immunities lack substance since rules of jus cogens and immunity operate 
on different levels.
149
  State immunity is a procedural rule and does not 
contradict a prohibition contained in a jus cogens norm, it only diverts any 
breach of it to a different method of settlement.
150
 It is the substantive 
prohibition of the act (torture, genocide etc.) that has jus cogens status, not 
the tools available under international law to enforce that prohibition. In the 
absence of a conflict between the two sets of rules, the jus cogens quality of 
one of them cannot “trump” the other.
151
 
Further, the argument that jus cogens international crimes removes the 
possibility to invoke immunity as a defence, has been rejected by both the 
ICJ and the ECtHR.
152
 By any logic, in case jus cogens international crimes 
“trump” the customary international law on functional immunity, it should also 
“trump” the customary international law on personal immunity. But it does not. 
In the Arrest Warrant Case, the ICJ emphasized the different natures of 
immunity and individual criminal responsibility:  
“Immunity from criminal jurisdiction and individual criminal responsibility are quite 
separate concepts. While jurisdictional immunity is procedural in nature, criminal 
responsibility is a question of substantive law.”153 
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Consequently, the ICJ concluded that the alleged jus cogens international 
crimes did not remove the applicability of personal immunity of senior state 
officials such as the head of state, the head of government, and the foreign 
minister. 
Also, in the case Al-Adsani vs. U.K.,
154
 the ECtHR rejected that immunity 
could not be admitted for acts in violation of a jus cogens international 
crime. The case regarded alleged acts of torture, and the ECtHR concluded 
that it was “unable to discern in the international instruments, judicial authorities or 
other materials before it any firm basis for concluding that, as a matter of international 
law, a State no longer enjoys immunity from civil suit in the courts of another State”. 
The ECtHR did not afford a norm of jus cogens an effect which “trumped” 
the rights of states to invoke immunity under customary international law. 
Although the case regards a civil suit, it should be noted that the concept of 
individual responsibility for crimes against international law also seems to 
extend to the civil responsibility of perpetrators.
155
 And even though it is a 
case involving state immunity, not head of state immunity, it can still be 
applied since it is a conceptual question between immunity and jus 
cogens.
156
 The status and conclusions of the current practice is also 
confirmed in the legal doctrine. Bassiouni, even though a supporter of the 
theory that jus cogens “trumps” over head of state immunity, recognizes that 
in most cases impunity has been allowed for jus cogens international 
crimes.
157
 In conclusion, it seems hard to find any evidence for this theory as 
rationale for removal of functional immunity for former heads of state in 
case of serious international crimes. 
3.3.4.3 International crimes are implied waivers of funtional 
immunity? 
 
The theory of implied waiver says that the serious international crime in 
itself implies that the head of state waives the normally afforded functional 
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immunity. Essentially, the criminal acts are not official acts since the state 
has no authority to violate jus cogens norms.
158
 In this way, it combines the 
previous two theories discussed above, but the difference is that it does not 
rely on the argument that jus cogens norms “trumps” the functional 
immunity. Instead, it is an implied waiver of such immunity. 
However, the theory has not received much support in the cases of national 
courts.
159
 In the case Pinochet No. 3, Lord Goff, as the only Lord that voted 
against the extradition request by Spain, concluded that any waiver of 
immunity must be express. His argument was that the 1984 Torture 
Convention did not include an express waiver of immunity, and rejected that 
it was implied.
160
 In the case Jones v. Saudi Arabia,
161
 the weak status of 
this theory was confirmed by Lord Hoffmann when he stated that the 
“theory of implied waiver […] has received no support in other decisions”. 
 
3.3.4.4 Rules of extra-territorial jurisdiction displace functional 
immunity? 
Another theory, brought forward by amongst others Akande and Shah, 
suggests that international crimes indeed can be official acts, but that the 
functional immunity is removed because a new rule permitting extra-
territorial jurisdiction over the crime has developed.
162
 
They argue that the denial of functional immunity in cases of international 
crimes is best explained by a development in international law which 
provides that the customary rule on functional immunity is in conflict with 
more recent rules of international law and the older rule must yield.
163
 The 
newer law developed permit states to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction in 
relation to international crimes. In such circumstances, they argue, there will 
be a conflict between the later jurisdictional rule and the prior rule of 
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immunity so that the two cannot be applied simultaneously.
164
 They express 
it as follows: 
“Where the application of the prior immunity would deprive the subsequent jurisdictional 
rule of practically all meaning, then the only logical conclusion must be that the 
subsequent jurisdictional rule is to be regarded as a removal of the immunity.”165 
They argue that these principles constitute the best explanation for the 
decision  in Pinochet No. 3, since most of the Lords concluded that granting 
functional immunity to Pinochet would be inconsistent with those 
provisions of the 1984 Torture Convention which accords universal 
jurisdiction for torture. The same argumentation was held by Lord Phillips: 
“International crimes and extra-territorial jurisdiction in relation to them are both new 
arrivals in the field of public international law. I do not believe that State immunity ratione 
materiae can co-exist with them. The exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction overrides the 
principle that one State will not intervene in the internal affairs of another. It does so 
because, where international crime is concerned, that principle cannot prevail. [...] Once 
extra-territorial jurisdiction is established, it makes no sense to exclude from it acts done in 
an official capacity”.166 
The theory sounds appealing. However, as critique against this theory, one 
could argue that it requires that states can exercise universal jurisdiction, 
which in itself can be questioned. Under the principle of universality, in the 
absence of other grounds for jurisdiction, all states have jurisdiction to try 
certain international crimes in their domestic courts.
167
 The rationale is that 
some crimes, such as jus cogens international crimes, are particularly 
offensive and directed against the international community as a whole. This 
is argued to entail a right to prosecute those responsible regardless of where 
and against whom the crimes were committed, as illustrated by the Italian 
Supreme Military Tribunal in the 1950 General Wagener case
168: “The 
solidarity among nations, aimed at alleviating in the best possible way the 
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horrors of war, gave rise to need to dictate rules which do not recognise 
borders, punishing war criminals wherever they may be.”169 
However, the concept of universal jurisdiction, and its limits, is debated and 
controversial. Beigbeder has expressed it as: “Universal jurisdiction is more 
a desirable objective than a reality.”170 Several other scholars argue that 
universal jurisdiction only exists when states have agreed to the exercise of 
such jurisdiction, for example in an international agreement.
 171
 That would 
explain the result of the decision of the Lords in Pinochet No. 3 since they 
heavily relied on the 1984 Torture Convention to reach their conclusion. 
But there has been made efforts to bring clarity to the matter of universal 
jurisdiction . In 2001, under the lead of Professor Bassiouni, a group of 
leading international legal scholars drafted The Princeton Principles on 
Universal Jurisdiction
172
 with the purpose to “advance the continued 
evolution of international law” and to “clarify and bring order the area of 
prosecutions for serious crimes under international law in national courts 
based on universal jurisdiction”.  Principle 1(1) state: 
“For purposes of these Principles, universal jurisdiction is criminal jurisdiction based 
solely on the nature of the crime, without regard to where the crime was committed, the 
nationality of the alleged or convicted perpetrator, the nationality of the victim, or any 
other connection to the state exercising such jurisdiction.” 
The crimes suggested to have universal jurisdiction are enlisted in principle 
2(1) and include piracy, slavery, war crimes, crimes against peace, crimes 
against humanity, genocide and torture, i.e. crimes that also have been 
suggested as jus cogens international crimes. Further, principle 5 states the 
following: 
“With respect to serious crimes under international law as specified in Principle 2(1), the 
official position of any accused person, whether as head of state or government or as a 
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responsible government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor 
mitigate punishment.”173 
This seems to correspond well with the view that jus cogens international 
crimes are under universal jurisdiction and also that their superiority 
removes the right to invoke immunity. However, the principles express both 
lex lata and de lege ferenda, and it is generally acknowledged that they only 
provide a useful guide and are of limited authority.
174
 As stated above, the 
purpose of the principles were to “advance the continued evolution of 
international law”. 
In defence of the principle of universal jurisdiction, it has been argued that 
universal jurisdiction has existed for centuries. But the view of universal 
jurisdiction as an obligation, or at least a right, for all states to try a range of 
crimes in their domestic courts because of the gravity of the case, is a 
relatively new one. Prior to the Nuremberg processes, universal jurisdiction 
was only accepted for the crime of piracy, and the reason was most likely 
because of the specifics of the crime in itself, not because of any recognition as 
a crime against international law.
175
 Thereafter, several multilateral 
conventions have been concluded in which the parties undertake to prosecute 
or extradite persons suspected of the crimes covered by the conventions, which 
are found within their territory. The 1949 Geneva Conventions provided the 
first examples where this principle of aut dedere aut judicare was expressed.
176
 
That might be seen as an expression for universal jurisdiction and a jus cogens 
obligation to prosecute or extradite. Another example with similar treaty-based 
universal jurisdiction, with an obligation to prosecute or extradite, is the 1984 
Torture Convention.
177
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However, even if there is an obligation upon the state party to act, there is no 
recognized obligation on third states to institute criminal prosecutions.
178
 
What about such third states not parties to the treaties? Art. 34 of the 1969 
Vienna Convention
179
 establish that a treaty is only binding for the parties to 
the treaty, and does not create either obligations or rights for a third state 
without its consent. Once again, it should be noted that only rules that are 
generally accepted by the international law community of states as a whole 
can become jus cogens. If becoming a party to a treaty is required for 
jurisdiction, this defies the principle of universal jurisdiction where, according 
to the definition, the seriousness of the crime alone should be sufficient to 
trigger jurisdiction. It can therefore be questioned whether treaties protecting 
jus cogens norms by criminalizing certain acts provide ‟true‟ universal 
jurisdiction. Instead, it is doubtful that violations of jus cogens norms 
automatically confer the right to exercise universal jurisdiction.
180
 This 
corresponds to the view of the scholars who argue that universal jurisdiction 
only exists when states have agreed to the exercise of such jurisdiction by an 
international treaty.  
In conclusion, universal jurisdiction has been asserted for an increasing 
number of human rights offences, but there is little practice to support this. 
Without a consistent practice, universal jurisdiction is only an academic 
aspiration, and not an established fact. And without evidence for the 
existence of universal jurisdiction, it is hard to support the theory of Akande 
and Shah suggesting a development in international law as an explanation to 
the non-applicability of functional immunity in cases of international crimes.  
3.4 Conclusions 
The Arrest Warrant case clearly confirms the customary rule of absolute 
personal immunity for serving heads of state. This immunity applies before 
                                                 
178
 Akande & Shah, supra 60, p. 835. 
179
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties signed at Vienna 23 May 1969. UNTS, vol. 
1155, I-18232. Available at: 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201155/volume-1155-I-18232-
English.pdf (2015-05-25) 
180
 Akande & Shah, supra 60, p. 836. 
 45 
national courts of foreign states irrespective of the gravity of the crime, i.e. 
even for serious international crimes. However, the personal immunity 
ceases when the head of state leaves office.  
Functional immunity exists alongside personal immunity for serving heads 
of state and becomes relevant only when the head of state leaves office. 
Even though cases such as Eichmann and Pinochet No. 3 seem to support a 
customary rule that functional immunity for former high state officials does 
not apply before foreign national courts in cases of serious international 
crimes, the outcome in these cases can be given different explanations. The 
Lords heavy reliance upon the 1984 Torture Convention in their conclusions 
in the Pinochet No. 3 devalues the precedence of the case, and does instead 
provide for the explanation for the outcome. In the Eichmann case, the 
Supreme Court of Israel concluded that functional immunity normally would 
apply, but that it would not apply in that particular case. One cannot look 
away from any political influence on the outcome. Further, the theories on 
why the functional immunity should be removed in cases of international 
crimes before domestic courts are diverse among the legal scholars, and 
most of them can be rightfully questioned. Instead, the conclusion drawn by 
the author of this thesis is that functional immunity for former heads of state 
is in fact still intact, even for serious international crimes, and that it will 
only be removed between states when they agree too, by waiving it or by 
becoming a party to an international convention with such content.   
 46 
4 Head of state immunity 
before international 
jurisdictions 
4.1 Introduction 
The Nuremberg Tribunal, recognizing the principles of individual 
responsibility and irrelevance of official capacity, was the first international 
effort to hold high-level officials accountable for their criminal actions.
181
 
Negotiations between the Allies during the summer of 1945 led to the 
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of 
the European Axis, and on 8 August 1945 the Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal
182
 (IMT) was adopted.
183
 The criminal jurisdiction of the 
tribunal was defined in article 6 of the Charter and confined to three 
categories of offences: crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. Article 7 of the Charter formulated the provision which described 
the irrelevance of official capacity: 
“The official position of defendants, whether Heads of State or responsible officials in 
Government Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or 
mitigating punishment.” 
This provision, called the Nuremberg formula, has served as a blueprint on 
the issue of individual criminal responsibility for all international tribunals 
to come. 
4.2 The ICTY and the ICTR 
After the International Military Tribunals of Nuremberg and Tokyo, it took 
almost half a century before the concept of international criminal courts was 
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revived.
184
 In 1992, a Commission of experts established by the Security 
Council identified a range of war crimes and crimes against humanity that 
had been committed, and was continuing, during the war in Bosnia.  
And in 1994, Rwanda requested assistance from the Security Council to 
prosecute the persons responsible for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law in Rwanda and neighbouring countries in 1994.
185
 
Triggered by theses grave violations of human rights, the ad hoc tribunals 
ICTY and ICTR were established in 1993 and 1994 by the UN Security 
Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
186
 The purpose for the 
establishment of the Tribunals was to restore international peace and security in 
the concerned regions.
187
 
The ICTY Statute
188
 and the ICTR Statute189 closely resemble each other, 
although the war crimes provisions reflect that the Rwandan genocide took 
place within the context of a purely internal armed conflict. The ICTY has 
jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, grave 
breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions as well as war crimes committed 
in the territory of former Yugoslavia since January 1991.
190
 The ICTR has 
jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity or serious 
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violations of the laws of war committed in the territory of Rwanda and 
Rwandan citizens responsible for such violations committed in the territory 
of neighbouring states between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994.
191
 
Both the ICTY and the ICTR contain identical provisions stating the 
irrelevance of capacity. They can be found in Art 7.2 of the ICTY Statute 
and Art 6.2 of the ICTR Statute: 
“The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or Government or 
as a responsible Government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal 
responsibility nor mitigate punishment.” 
The articles provide for criminal responsibility and the removal of immunities 
normally vested in heads of state under customary international law. 
A justified question though is how a Tribunal established by the Security 
Council under Chapter VII can remove such immunities of heads of state? The 
answer is to be found in the UN Charter.
192
 Art. 25 of the UN Charter state: 
“The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the 
Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.” 
 Further, under Art. 103, the obligations under the UN Charter prevail over 
other international obligations: 
“In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations 
under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, 
their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.” 
Consequently, since all state parties to the UN Charter (all UN members) must 
accept Security Council Resolutions and such resolutions prevail over other 
sources of international law, like the customary rules of head of state immunity, 
such immunities do not apply before the ICTY or the ICTR.
193
 However, the 
provisions of the statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR stating the irrelevance 
of official capacity have not been applied in that many cases, but their 
importance is none the less very significant.  
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4.2.1 Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda 
On October 19, 2000, Jean Kambanda, the former prime minister of 
Rwanda
194
 was sentenced in the appeals chamber of the ICTR to life 
imprisonment for his involvement in the genocide and crimes against 
humanity against the Tutsi in Rwanda in 1994.
195
 The judgement marks the 
first time that a head of government has been convicted of genocide.
196
 
When Kambanda was charged, he pleaded guilty to all of the six charges 
against him.
197
 He never invoked immunity and never questioned the 
jurisdiction of the ICTR. After a first conviction by the trial chamber on 4 
September 1998, Kambanda filed an appeal on several grounds, but 
immunity was not one of them.
198
 Kambanda was denied a new trial, but the 
appeals chamber tried the appeal. Since Kambanda never invoked immunity, 
it was never addressed by the appeals chamber either.  
As the first case in which a former head of government has been convicted 
of genocide, it stands as a landmark against impunity for serious 
international crimes.
199
  
4.2.2 Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic 
In the case Prosecutor v. Milosevic,
200
 the question of head of state 
immunity was tried for the first time before the ICTY. Milosevic had been 
arrested 1 April 2001 in Belgrade by local authorities and transferred to the 
ICTY in the Hague on 29 June 2001. He was originally indicted for war 
crimes and crimes against humanity, but other indictments were added later, 
including a charge of genocide.
201
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Milosevic was head of state from 15 July 1997 to 6 October 2000, and the 
first indictment was issued on 22 May 1999, i.e. while Milosevic was still 
the serving president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The 
issue was never raised whether Milosevic as serving head of state was 
entitled to personal immunity, because when he was transferred to Hague to 
stand trial, he was no longer in office. Therefore, Milosevic stated that the 
ICTY did not have jurisdiction over him as a former head of state since he 
was entitled to invoke functional immunity. In response, the Trial Chamber 
of the ICTY stated: 
“There is absolutely no basis for challenging the validity of article 7, paragraph 2, which 
at this time reflects a rule of customary international law. The history of this rule can be 
traced to the development of the doctrine of individual criminal responsibility after the 
Second World War, when it was incorporated in article 7 of the Nuremberg Charter and 
article 6 of the Tokyo Tribunal Charter. The customary character of the rule is further 
supported by its incorporation in a wide number of other instruments, as well as case law.” 
However, Milosevic died of a heart attack on 11 March 2006 before the 
completion of the trial. Even so, along with the case Prosecutor v. 
Kambanda, the case must still be regarded as a decisive precedent on the 
irrelevance of official capacity and non-applicability of head of state 
immunity before an international criminal tribunal, established by the 
Security Council under Chapter VII.
 202
 
4.2.3 Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic 
On 25 July 1995, the ICTY issued an indictment and arrest warrant against 
Radovan Karadzic,
203
 the former president of the Serbian Republic, for 
genocide, crimes against humanity and violations of the laws or customs of 
war. He was arrested by Serbian police and surrendered to the ICTY on 30 
July 2008.
204
 He pleaded not guilty to the charges. Karadzic has not invoked 
head of state immunity, but has instead claimed that an agreement was 
reached between him and the U.S. negotiator Richard Holbrooke during the 
Dayton peace talks in November 1995. The content of the agreement was 
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that Karadzic would not be prosecuted by the ICTY in exchange for 
completely withdrawing from public life.
205
 The Trial Chamber dismissed 
his arguments and held that even if such an agreement existed Holbrook 
would not have acted with the authority of the Security Council and that 
Holbrook, as a third party, could not promise immunity years prior to 
Karadzic’s transfer to the ICTY.206 Further, the ICTY stated that there is no 
provision in the Statute that excludes any specific individual from the 
jurisdiction of the court.  
The closing arguments took place from 29 September until 7 October 2014. 
Although the outcome of the case is not yet decided,
207
 it is apparent that the 
ICTY does not regard functional immunities of former heads of state as a 
bar to its jurisdiction. 
4.3 Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) 
The SCSL was established in 2002 pursuant to Security Council Resolution 
1315 (2000),
208
 The background was that the government of Sierra Leone 
had requested the UN to establish an international court to prosecute those 
responsible for the serious violations of international humanitarian law that 
had taken place in the Sierra Leone civil war (1991-2002). The SCSL was 
established with the purpose to prosecute those persons who had the greatest 
responsibility for the human rights violations.
209
 Just like the ICTY and the 
ICTR, the SCSL has an article stating the irrelevance of official capacity, 
inspired by the Nuremberg formula. Article 6(2) provides: 
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“The official position of any accused persons, whether as Head of State or Government or 
as a responsible government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal 
responsibility nor mitigate punishment.” 
The SCSL is often referred to as a hybrid court. A difference with the SCSL, 
compared to the ICTY and ICTR, is that the powers of the SCSL are not 
enhanced through a Chapter VII resolution.
210
 Instead, it is “a treaty-based 
sui generis court of mixed jurisdiction and composition”.
211
 The legal basis of 
the Court is the Agreement on the Establishment of a Special Court for 
Sierra Leone.
212
 This critical difference compared to the ad hoc tribunals 
would become one of the main issues regarding the head of state immunity 
of Charles Taylor in the case Prosecutor v. Taylor,
213
 discussed below.  
4.3.1 Prosecutor v. Taylor 
When the SCSL issued an indictment and arrest warrant for Charles Taylor 
in March 2003, he was the serving head of state of Liberia.
214
 Taylor 
resigned as head of state in August 2003.
 
He was arrested and transferred to 
the SCSL in November 2006.  
Taylor filed an application and objected to the indictment and the arrest 
warrant on the ground that he was entitled to head of state immunity from 
the jurisdiction of the SCSL.
215
 He argued that the indictment was invalid 
since the Arrest Warrant case had established that serving heads of state 
enjoy absolute immunity, and that the SCSL did not have such Chapter VII 
powers which would allow exceptions to such immunities.
216
 However, as 
can be recalled from the Arrest Warrant case, the ICJ in its obiter dictum 
also stated in the list of exceptions to personal immunity, in particular that 
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“certain international courts” still may have jurisdiction.217 Is the SCSL 
such an international Court? 
The application of Taylor was referred to the appeals chamber of the SCSL, 
which concluded that the sovereign equality of states does not prevent a 
head of state from being prosecuted before an international criminal tribunal 
or court.
218
 The SCSL stated that “there is no reason to conclude that it 
should be treated as anything other than an international tribunal or court, 
with all that implies for the question of immunity for a serving Head of 
State”.219 The SCSL further stated that there is no support in state practice 
that international law grants immunities in relation to international courts 
and found that the jurisdiction of the SCSL is similar to that of the ICTY, 
the ICTR and the ICC, also when it regards the personal immunity of a head 
of state.
220
 Consequently, the SCSL dismissed Taylor’s application, revoked 
the head of state immunity and sentenced him to life imprisonment. 
4.4 Special Tribunal for Lebanon  
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) was established by the UN Security 
Council through Resolution 1757,
221
 which was passed under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter. Originally STL was meant to be a hybrid criminal court, like 
the SCSL, but because of political considerations it was instead created by the 
Security Council.
222
 
The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is specified to persons responsible for attacks 
that occurred in Lebanon between 1 October 2004 and 12 December 2005, and 
specifically to persons responsible for the attack on 14 February 2005 resulting 
in the death of the former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri and death and 
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injuries of other persons. The jurisdiction can be extended by the UN and 
Lebanon with the consent of the Security Council.
223
 
The Statute has some features in common with the statutes of the other ad hoc 
tribunals, ICTY and ICTR, but also some major differences.
224
 Art. 3 of the 
Statute of the STL contain provisions on individual criminal responsibility, but 
the Statute does not contain any provision that removes immunities. It is 
therefore uncertain how this would be handled by the STL.
225
 However, at this 
writing, there are no cases involving heads of state before the STL. 
4.5 Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia 
The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) was 
established in 2004 in cooperation with the UN.  However, it is a hybrid 
national-international court within the judiciary system of Cambodia with a 
majority of Cambodian judges.
226
 The Court was established by a 
Cambodian law
227
 to bring senior leaders and those most responsible to trial 
for crimes and violations of Cambodian and humanitarian law committed 
during the period from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979.
228
 In Art. 29 of the 
law, the irrelevance of official capacity is stated: 
“The position or rank of any Suspect shall not relieve such person of criminal 
responsibility or mitigate punishment.” 
However, since it is a Cambodian court trying only Cambodian citizens, 
questions of international immunities will not arise.
229
 For that reason, the 
EEEC will not be discussed further. 
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4.6 Analysis 
The Milosevic case and the Karadzic cases of the ICTY, and the Kambanda 
case of the ICTR show that the jurisdiction of international criminal 
tribunals established by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter render head of state immunity inapplicable, be it functional or 
personal immunity. However, it has been argued that a provision concerning 
the irrelevance of official capacity for the responsibility of the accused is not 
enough to remove personal immunity, only functional immunity.
230
 It has 
been questioned whether the ICTY and the ICTR have jurisdiction to indict 
serving heads of state since the Statues do not provide that personal 
immunity does not apply.
231
 Van Alebeek argues that the personal immunity 
of heads of state applies erga omnes, also before the ICTY and the ICTR, as 
opposed to the personal immunity of diplomats which only applies between 
the receiving and transit states. Other scholars argue that personal immunity 
in no case applies before international tribunals, such as the ICTY and 
ICTR, and that the law and practice of those tribunals support this.
232
 In the 
words of Schabas: 
“To the extent that there is no immunity for a Head of State before the ad hoc tribunals, 
this can only be by implication. Justification for such an implication is found in the fact of 
the establishment of the tribunals by the United Nations Security Council. [Personal] 
immunity applies to relations between States, and is not relevant when a United Nations-
created tribunal is involved”.233 
The latter conclusion seems a lot more feasible. The resolutions by which 
ICTY and ICTR were established give them an authority to set aside rules 
that would apply before a domestic court. After all, personal immunity is 
only a rule under customary international law. Since Security Council 
resolutions issued under Chapter VII of the UN Charter prevail over other 
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sources of international law, it is the interpretation of this author that personal 
immunities afforded to heads of state cannot apply before the ICTY or the 
ICTR. 
The situation is more complex regarding the jurisdiction of the SCSL and 
the question of personal immunity, as illustrated by the case Prosecutor v. 
Taylor. The question was whether the issuance of the indictment and 
circulation of the warrant for Taylors arrest was allowed since Taylor at the 
time was the serving head of state. The answer from the SCSL was ‘yes’. But 
the judgement has been criticized. It is apparent that the SCSL is an 
international court; it was established through the UN and is not part of 
Sierra Leone’s judicial system. However, it might still be held that it does 
not have jurisdiction over persons entitled to personal immunity.
234
 The 
argument is that an international court may only have the power to exercise 
jurisdiction over serving heads of state under certain conditions. Such 
conditions would include situations when the home state of the national has 
accepted the Courts jurisdiction or when the Court has been given Chapter 
VII powers by the Security Council, either prior to or subsequent to the 
establishment.
235
 In the lack of such a condition, the personal immunity is 
absolute, also before an international court.
236
 In that sense, the SCSL is 
different compared to the ICTY and the ICTR since they are established by 
the Security Council under Chapter VII. 
In this author’s opinion, there is no valid ground to argue, as the SCSL did, 
that it has the same powers as the ICTY and the ICTR just because it is 
established in cooperation with the UN. The similar wording of the articles 
regarding irrelevance of official capacity does not determine whether 
personal immunity applies or not. The ICTY and the ICTR were established 
by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII, whereas the SCSL is a 
treaty based international court. The necessary connection is missing 
between the Security Council and the SCSL, through Art. 25 and Art. 103 of 
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the UN Charter, which is required to remove customary rules of head of 
state immunity afforded to serving heads of state. The problems in this case 
were that the indictment was issued while Taylor was still head of state. 
Despite the judgement, it is still unclear whether the SCSL has jurisdiction 
over a serving head of state. In the words of Schabas: 
“It may be that Taylor had no claim to [personal] immunity before the Special Court, but 
this is not the consequence of Article 6(2) of its Statute”.237 
However, when Taylor was transferred to the SCSL, he was no longer the 
serving head of state.  Perhaps all this could have been avoided if the SCSL 
had cancelled and issued a new indictment? There is no doubt that a former 
head of state cannot invoke functional immunity before the SCSL.
238
 
It has sometimes been argued that the international tribunals, and their 
practice, contribute to the development of a new customary international 
law, limiting the possibility of serving or former heads of state to invoke 
head of state immunity. This write however, does not agree with such 
conclusions, at least not regarding the ICTY and the ICTR. Customary 
international law does not arise out of UN Resolutions, but out of state 
practice and opinio juris. The capacity of the tribunals to remove immunities 
should instead to be seen as exceptions to customary international law 
powered by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII. The SCSL, 
however, is not established under Chapter VII, and because of that it would 
possibly be easier to recognize the practice of the SCSL as contributing to 
the development of customary international law.  
 
4.7 Conclusions 
Both personal and functional immunity for heads of state are removed 
before the jurisdictions of the ICTY and ICTR. The reason for this is the 
power vested in them through the Security Council acting under Chapter VII 
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of the UN Charter in order to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.  
There is no question that functional immunity of former heads of state is no 
bar to the jurisdiction of the SCSL. The rationale behind functional 
immunity is that the crime is committed by the state, not the individual. The 
provision in the SCSL Statute affirming individual responsibility and 
irrelevance of official capacity ensures this. However, it is questionable 
whether the SCSL made the right decision when it concluded that personal 
immunity is not a bar to its jurisdiction. As a hybrid court without the 
“Chapter VII-powers”, it does not have the same authority as the ICTY and 
the ICTR. 
Although the STL is an ad hoc tribunal established by the Security Council, 
its Statute does not contain a provision that can be construed as to remove 
immunities for former or serving heads of state. It is therefore uncertain how it 
would be handled by the STL in case the situation came up. 
Finally, as illustrated by the EEEC, the question of international immunities 
of heads of state will not arise in cases where nationals are being tried by a 
national court, even if the court to some extent has been established with the 
cooperation of the UN. 
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5 Head of state immunity and the 
International Criminal Court 
5.1 Introduction 
As was explained in the introduction of this thesis, the establishment of the 
ICC led to high expectations for the future of humanitarian rights and 
international justice through the exercise of criminal jurisdiction. Although the 
creation of the ad hoc tribunals ICTY and ICTR had shown that those 
responsible for serious international crimes could be brought to justice, it 
would likely not be possible to establish similar tribunals in every possible 
international situation. Unlike the ICTY and the ICTR, which were based on 
Security Council Resolutions under Chapter VII under the UN Charter, the 
ICC is based on a multilateral treaty, the Rome Statute.  
The establishment of the ICC had been an extensive process. The first 
serious efforts towards a permanent international criminal court were 
initiated in 1926 when the AIDP and ILA jointly created a draft statute on 
the establishment on a permanent international criminal court.
239
 It was 
presented to several European parliaments and the League of Nations, but 
because of the political differences and the following Second World War, 
there was no conclusive result. After the Second World War, and the 
adoption of the Nuremberg Principles in 1950, the UN General Assembly 
instructed the ILC to make preparations for a permanent international 
court.
240
 But once again, the work was futile. Because of the Cold War and 
difficulties in agreeing upon a definition of the crime of aggression, the 
international unity required for the establishment of a permanent 
international criminal court was impossible to achieve, and the work was 
suspended in 1954. It took until the 1990’s before any serious progress was 
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made in this process.
241
 The horrors that were unveiled at the ad hoc 
tribunals ICTY and ICTR also came to remind the international community 
of the need for a permanent international criminal court. The ILC was 
instructed by the UN General Assembly to continue its work, which finally 
culminated in the 1998 UN Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, also called the Rome 
Conference.
242
 
At the Rome Conference some issues proved difficult to solve because of 
their political nature. Such issues were the specifics of the crimes, the scope 
of the Court’s jurisdiction as well as the role of the Security Council.243  But 
despite these difficulties the Rome Statute was eventually adopted on 17 
July 1998 by 120 states, and finally entered into force on 1 July 2002, after 
the ratification by 60 states. Within a year, the ICC was fully operational.
244
 
This marked a milestone in international criminal law. 
In accordance with the Rome Statute, Art. 11, the Court has only jurisdiction 
over events that took place after the entry into force of the statute, i.e. after 1 
July 2002. This main rule of non-retroactivity of treaties is also confirmed 
by Art. 28 of the 1969 Vienna Convention.
245
 Also, the Rome Statute, like 
all international treaties, is only binding upon its parties. This principle, that 
a treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third state without 
its consent, is stated in Art. 34 of the 1969 Vienna Convention. The success 
of the ICC is therefore reliant upon a broad support among states. And since 
the Rome Statute is treaty-based and only binding upon the contracting 
states, the question is how this affects the jurisdiction of the ICC? 
In this chapter, the thesis will investigate the status of immunities afforded 
to heads of state of both parties and non-parties to the Rome Statute. But to 
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understand the question of immunity, it is important to give a brief 
introduction to other aspects of the Court. It is not within the scope of this 
work to analyse the function of the Court, but a brief presentation of the 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court’s jurisdiction, and the 
principle of complementarity is essential for understanding the concept of 
head of state immunity before the ICC.  
5.2 Crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court 
The crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court are described as ”the most 
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole”, both 
in Art.5 and in the preamble to the Rome Statute. Art. 5 states that the Court 
has jurisdiction over four categories of crimes: genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and aggression. 
5.2.1 The crime of genocide 
Genocide is covered in Art. 6 of the Rome Statute and defines genocide as 
“acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group”. There was not much controversy 
regarding the crime of genocide during the preparatory process. The 
definition included in Art. 6 is materially identical to Art. II of the 1948 
Genocide Convention.
246
 The Convention reflects customary international 
law, and during the Rome Conference there was a consensus among states to 
use the widely accepted definition of the crime.
247
  
5.2.2 Crimes against humanity 
The definition of crimes against humanity is included in Art. 7 of the 
Statute. The inclusion of crimes against humanity might be viewed as the 
implementation of human rights norms in the Rome Statute. An agreement 
on the definition proved to be difficult to achieve during the drafting 
process, although it was never questioned whether crimes against humanity 
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should be included in the Statute.
248
 The requirements of the crime are that it 
should be a “widespread or systematic attack” and that it should be 
“directed against any civilian population” and the perpetrator should have 
“knowledge of the attack”. The definition in Art.7 differs from the definition 
of the crime in the statutes of the ICTY and ICTR, first and foremost since 
the definition explains that the crime can be committed in time of peace as 
well as in time of war.
249
 
5.2.3 War Crimes 
War crimes are defined in Art. 8 of the Statute. Many of the crimes listed in 
Art. 8 can cover certain isolated acts, and investigating and prosecuting such 
acts are not within the scope of the Court. Therefore, it is stated that the 
Court shall have jurisdiction in respect to war crimes “in particular when 
committed as a part of a plan or policy or as a part of a large-scale 
commission of such crimes”.  Art.8 refers to the war crimes of the 1907 
Hague Convention, the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 
Additional protocols I and II.
250
 The novelty of the Rome Statute was that 
for the first time war crimes committed in a non-international armed conflict 
was codified. Further, new crimes such as the recruitment of child soldiers 
and attacks on peace keepers were recognized.
 251
 In this sense, the Rome 
Stature is a progressive development of international criminal law. 
5.2.4 Aggression 
The crime of aggression is included in Art. 8 bis of the Statute, a result of 
amendments to the Rome Statute adopted at the 2010 Kampala Review 
Conference.
252
 During the Rome Conference, significant controversies had 
arisen concerning the crime of aggression, which had resulted in a 
declaration that the Court shall “exercise jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression once a provision is adopted”. By the adoption of the definition 
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of aggression, “the most important gap in the text of the Rome Statute is now 
filled”. 253  
Art. 8 bis defines the crime of aggression. The crime can only be performed 
by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the 
political or military action of a state, who was involved in the planning, 
preparation, initiation or execution of the act of aggression. The act in itself 
must amount to an act of aggression in accordance with the definition 
contained in General Assembly Resolution 3314,
254
 and it must, by its 
character, gravity and scale, constitute a manifest violation of the UN 
Charter.  This ensures that only illegal use of force can be subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Court and that lawful use of force, such as self-defense 
and Security Council authorized force, is excluded.
255
 
However, the Court will not be able to exercise jurisdiction over the crime 
of aggression before two thirds of the parties to the Statute have taken a 
decision to activate the jurisdiction, and not before 1 January 2017.
256
 
5.3 Jurisdiction 
The group of articles governing the jurisdiction of the Court caused a great 
deal of debate during the entire preparatory process of the Rome Statute. The 
reason is that the articles address the fundamental issue of what restrictions 
should be imposed on the sovereignty of the state parties, as well as the 
function of the Security Council.
257
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5.3.1 Preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction 
The ICC cannot exercise universal jurisdiction, which was the original 
purpose by a clear majority of the states during the Rome Conference.
258
 
Instead, the situations in which the Court has jurisdiction are limited. 
Art. 11 provides that the Court has jurisdiction with respect to crimes 
committed after the entry into force of the Statute, i.e. after 1 July 2002. 
Also, if a state joins the Court after 1 July 2002, the Court has only 
jurisdiction after the Statute entered into force for that state, unless the state 
accepts the jurisdiction of the Court for the period before it became a 
contracting party. And Art. 12(1) provides that a state which becomes a 
party to the Statute, thereby accepts the jurisdiction of the Court with respect 
to the crimes referred to in Art. 5. 
There are two, well-established principles that determine when the ICC has 
jurisdiction. First, Art 12(2)(a) provides that the Court may exercise 
jurisdiction if the crime took place in the territory of a state party or in the 
territory of a non-party state accepting the jurisdiction of the Court. This 
principle of territorial jurisdiction is universally accepted in international 
criminal law and can be found in many treaties and conventions.
259
 If a 
crime is committed in a member state by a national of a non-party state, the 
Court will be able to exercise jurisdiction. In other words, the nationality of 
the offender is irrelevant.
260
 
Secondly, Art. 12(2)(b) provides that the Court may exercise jurisdiction if 
the accused of the crime is a national of a state party or a national of a non-
party state accepting the jurisdiction of the Court. The principle of active 
personality jurisdiction is well established in the domestic law among a 
majority of states.
261
 In the context of international criminal law, the 
principle is universally accepted and by state practice and opinio juris a rule 
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customary law.
262
 In case a national of a member state commits a crime in a 
non-member state, the Court will be able to exercise jurisdiction. In other 
words, the Court has in this sense extra-territorial jurisdiction. 
Further, Art. 12(3) declares that a non-state party can accept the jurisdiction 
of the Court on an ad hoc basis without becoming a party to the Rome 
Statute. The prerequisite is that the crime was committed in that state’s 
territory or by one of its nationals.
263
 This possibility was not controversial 
during the Rome Conference but has since then been criticized, especially by 
the U.S.
264
 The concern was that a non-state party would be able to pick a 
particular incident over which it would grant the ICC jurisdiction, but that 
the actions of the non-state party itself was outside the jurisdiction of the 
Court. The argument for the criticism was that the rule easily could be 
abused.
 265
 It is still to some extent debated how this rule shall be 
interpreted, but the prevailing opinion seems to be that an acceptance of the 
Courts jurisdiction is made regarding a whole situation, not a particular 
crime.
266
  
5.3.2 Exercise of jurisdiction 
If any crime listed in Art. 5 occurs in any of those situations listed in the 
previous chapter, Art. 13 triggers the jurisdiction by providing that a state 
party may refer the situation to the Prosecutor, or the Prosecutor may initiate 
an investigation propio motu.
267
 Any referral by a state party to the 
Prosecutor must be in conformity with Art. 14, where the relevant rules are 
stated.
268
 It should be noted that only state parties can trigger the Courts 
jurisdiction. There can be no ad hoc referrals by non-state parties, unless it 
concerns their own citizens or territory in accordance with the process 
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described above.
269
 It is also important to note that any state party has this 
capacity, even though it is not directly involved in the situation. For the sake 
of effectiveness and independence of the Court, it is essential that the 
Prosecutor has the competence to independently initiate an investigation 
with respect to crimes within the Courts jurisdiction. This must be done in 
conformity with Art. 15, where the relevant rules are stated.
270
  
However, Art. 13 also provides that the Court may exercise its jurisdiction 
with respect to situations that the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter, refer to the Prosecutor. Unlike the situations of state 
party referral and independent initiative by the Prosecutor, there are no 
further rules in the Rome Statute dealing with Security Council referral.
271
 
Once the Security Council has determined, in accordance with Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter, that a crime listed in article 5 has been committed, it 
may refer that situation to the Prosecutor. Chapter VII gives the Security 
Council power to act in “the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of 
the peace, or act of aggression”.272  Since the preconditions of Art. 12(2), 
i.e. a connection to the territory of a member state or the state membership 
of the accused, does not address conferral of jurisdiction by the Security 
Council, it must be presumed that those conditions do not have to be met.
273
 
This is however not stated explicitly in the Statute. However, it suggests that 
any crime listed in Art. 5 in theory could be referred to the Court by the 
Security Council, irrespective of where or by whom it was committed as 
long as the crime was committed after the entry into force of the Rome 
Statute. This is a position that has met fierce opposition.
274
 There are, 
however, still some situations where the powers of the Security Council are 
limited. In the case Prosecutor v. Tadic,
275
 the Appeals Chamber of the 
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ICTY, which as we recall is also powered by the Security Council under 
Chapter VII, has noted “[t]he Security Council is thus subjected to certain 
constitutional limitations, however broad its powers under the constitution 
may be”. 276 That suggests that the Security Council perhaps cannot refer 
any situation to the Court.
277
 Also, any referral by the Security Council must 
define the parameters of the situation to which it refers. As an example, 
which will be discussed below, the Security Council Resolution which 
directed the situation in Sudan to the ICC referred to “Darfur” which is only 
a regional province of the country.
 278
 
5.4 Complementarity 
A fundamental issue during the drafting of the Rome Statute was the 
relationship between the Court and national courts since it concerned the 
sovereignty of the state parties to the Statute. The work resulted in the 
principle of complementarity, which is central to the philosophy of the 
Court. In fact, it is doubtful whether the Rome Statute could have been 
adopted without it.
279
 In Art. 17, three factors determine if a situation is 
admissible to the Court: complementarity, ne bis in idem (double jeopardy) 
and the gravity of the case. The Court may not proceed with a case if any of 
these factors are present.
280
 This thesis will not discuss ne bis in idem or the 
gravity of the case, but will instead discuss the principle of complementarity. 
Already in the preamble, the Rome Statute provides that the Court ”shall 
have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious 
crimes of international concern … and shall be complementary to national 
criminal jurisdictions”.281 The importance of the principle cannot be 
understated and it is referred to in several places in the Statute.
282
 
Complementarity means that the national jurisdiction of the state party has 
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primacy over the jurisdiction of the Court, and Art. 17 states that the Court 
may only assume jurisdiction when a state is unable or unwilling to 
genuinely carry out the investigation or prosecution. It can be pointed out 
that it is for the Court to decide whether these conditions are met, not the 
state party.
283
 This test of “unable or unwilling” was a sensitive issue during 
the preparation of the Statute since some states feared that the Court might 
be passing judgement on national systems.
284
  
In order to determine unwillingness, three factors are listed in Art. 17(2). A 
state is determined to be unwilling if the proceedings or decision not to 
prosecute are or were made to shield the person concerned, if there is an 
unjustified delay in the proceedings, or if the proceedings are or were not 
independent or impartially conducted. The aim is that a case shall be 
admissible to the Court in situations where a national justice system is trying 
to make it look as if an investigation and prosecution is underway or has 
taken place although that is not the case.
285
 In order to determine inability, 
three factors are listed in Art. 17(3). A state is rendered unable to carry out 
an investigation and prosecution if the state is unable to obtain the accused, 
if the state is unable to obtain the necessary evidence and/or testimony, or if 
the state is unable to otherwise carry out its proceedings. These are 
situations when a state lacks the ability to investigate or prosecute, even 
when it is willing. It should be noted that inactivity of a state also would 
make a case admissible to the Court, even in cases where if it would not fall 
within the scope of unwillingness or inability.
286
  
5.5 Head of state immunity at the ICC 
As this thesis has shown, international criminal courts have been established 
in different situations. In a way, they can be looked upon as separate 
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generations of international criminal courts. The first generation was the 
Nuremberg tribunal, which was the result of the four victorious powers 
wishing to prosecute and punish the major war criminals of the European 
Axis. The principle of irrelevance of official capacity has its origin in Art. 7 
of the Nuremberg Charter. The second generation is the ad hoc tribunals 
ICTY and ICTR, established by the Security Council under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter. The provisions stating the irrelevance of capacity were 
virtually identical to the provision in Nuremberg Charter. The third 
generation is the ICC, established by a multilateral treaty. Like the previous 
generations, it contains a provision regarding the irrelevance of official 
capacity. 
5.5.1 Article 27 
In many ways, Art. 27 represents the purpose of the Rome Statute. It is one 
of the clearest manifestations in the Statute of the determination expressed 
in the preamble “to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these 
crimes and thus contribute to the prevention of such crimes”.287 Art. 27 
states: 
1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on 
official capacity. In particular, official capacity as Head of State or Government, 
a member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a 
government official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility 
under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of 
sentence. 
2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of 
a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the court 
from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person. 
Although the wording of Art. 27 is similar to the wordings of Nuremberg 
charter and the Statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR, there are differences. 
The novelty was first and foremost the introduction of the second paragraph, 
which fulfils a different function than the first.
288
 The first paragraph, which 
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denies a defence of official capacity, is derived from the Nuremberg Charter 
and is also similar to the ones found in the Statutes of the ICTY and the 
ICTR. The second paragraph, which had no precedent in international 
criminal law when it was introduced in the Rome Statute, contains a 
renunciation of the head of state immunity by the parties to the statute.
 289
 
The differences will now be looked at in further detail. 
 
5.5.1.1 Article 27(1) 
 
As we can recall from previous chapters, the defence for functional 
immunity is that the crime is committed by the state, not the individual state 
official. By including a provision stating the individual responsibility and 
irrelevance of official capacity, such protection is effectively removed.
290
 
Hence, Art. 27(1) declares the removal of functional immunity before the 
Court, but was never an issue for much debate during the Rome 
Conference.
291
 Similar provisions had been successfully included in the 
Nuremberg Charter and the Statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR and was 
well-established.
292
 Although basically similar, Art. 27(1) did however 
differentiate itself somewhat from previous versions. It begins with a 
statement that the Rome Statute shall apply equally to all persons. This 
expresses one of the main purposes of the Statute, which is to proclaim that 
all persons committing a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court shall be 
individually responsible.
293
 It puts some extra focus on and enforces Art. 25 
which states the main provisions of individual criminal responsibility. Art. 
27(1) further removes the official capacity as a defence to several named 
categories of state officials: heads of state or government, members of 
governments or parliaments, elected representatives and government 
officials. None of the previous articles in the Nuremberg Charter or statues 
of the ICTY or ICTR is as detailed. It ensures that the article applies to all 
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state officials, including those who hold de facto authority.
294
 Art. 27(1) also 
contains an elaborated version of the wording explaining that an official 
position cannot constitute a ground for reduction of the sentence. 
By removing functional immunity, Art. 27(1) ensures that the Court will 
have jurisdiction over former heads of state of the state parties.  
5.5.1.2 Article 27(2) 
 
Art 27(2) addresses the personal immunity of serving state officials who are 
entitled to such immunity in accordance with customary international law, 
i.e. heads of state and government and foreign ministers.
295
 The customary 
rule of absolute personal immunity is affirmed in the Arrest Warrant case 
where the ICJ entitled a serving foreign minister personal immunity. But the 
ICJ also concluded that serving state officials may be subject to “certain 
international criminal courts, where they have jurisdiction” and gave the 
ICC as an example.
296
 State parties, by their ratification of the Rome Statute, 
have accepted the provisions included therein and have thereby also 
renounced their right to invoke personal immunity in respect of the crimes in 
Art. 5.
297
 In the words of Schabas: 
“..there is no doubt that article 27(2) removes any plea of immunity from the relevant 
officials of State Parties to the Rome Statute”.298 
From the above is it possible to conclude that Art. 27(1) removes the 
functional immunity of former senior officials of state parties, and that Art. 
27(2) removes the personal immunity of serving senior officials of state 
parties. But how does Art. 27 apply in the case of non-party states? 
5.5.1.3 Non-party states and Article 27 
As previously stated, Art. 34 of the 1980 Vienna Convention provides that a 
treaty is only binding upon the parties to the treaty.
299
 Since non-party states 
have not ratified the Rome Statute, they have not renounced their right to 
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invoke immunity under Art. 27. But at the same time, the Security Council 
can refer situations involving non-party states to the Court under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter. If a state official of a non-party state is entitled to 
invoke immunity according to customary international law, there would be a 
conflict between Art. 27 and international law. Under these circumstances, 
the question is whether Art. 27, as a provision of a multilateral treaty, can 
remove the functional or personal immunity of serving state officials of non-
parties? Some leading scholars argue that it cannot do so, at least not 
regarding the personal immunity.
300
 The principle that a treaty cannot set 
aside the rights of non-party states is central to such arguments. 
However, other scholars argue for a contradicting customary international 
law that removes immunities of former and serving state officials before 
international criminal courts and tribunals in cases of international crimes.
301
 
If that is correct, and both Art. 27(1) and 27(2) reflect customary 
international law, there would not be a conflict. These very questions have 
been put to test in some cases before the ICC and those will be discussed in 
chapter 5.5.3 below. 
5.5.2 Article 98 
Immunities are also considered in Art.98 of the Statute. Under the Rome 
Statute, state parties have obligations to surrender accused persons to the 
Court and other forms of cooperation. Such obligations are stated in Part IX 
of the Rome Statute (Art. 86-102). Art. 98 states exceptions to such 
obligations. In Art. 98, the first paragraph covers international obligations in 
relation to immunities, and the second paragraph covers obligations in 
relation to international agreements: 
1. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which would 
require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law 
with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or property of a third State, 
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unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of that third State for the waiver of the 
immunity.  
2. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the 
requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements 
pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is required to surrender a person of that 
State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of the sending State for 
the giving of consent for the surrender.  
5.5.2.1 Article 98(1) 
Under customary international law, states have the obligation to respect the 
immunities of diplomats and other state officials, and the Rome Statute has 
the potential to conflict with such obligations.
302
 Art. 98(1) provides that the 
Court cannot request a state party to cooperate if such cooperation would 
violate the personal immunity of a state official of a non-party state.
303
 In 
case the Court agrees that the request is in conflict with such immunities 
belonging to a non-party state, it may apply to the state for a waiver.
304
  It 
might be that the non-party state is under an obligation to cooperate under an 
international treaty, such as the 1948 Genocide Convention, and waives the 
immunity. It has also been argued that states are under an obligation to 
cooperate under the principle aut dedere aut judicare,
305
 when it comes to 
serious international crimes.
306
 It should be noted that Art. 98 is inapplicable 
to immunities of the requested state itself, since any state that becomes a 
party to the Rome Statute renounces any claim they may have to immunity 
before the Court.
307
 That means that a head of state of a state party cannot 
rely upon Art. 98(1) as a bar for arrest and surrender when travelling to 
another state which is a party to the Statute. The question is whether a head 
of state of a non-party state is protected against arrest and surrender by Art. 
98(1) when present in the territory of a state party? That issue was addressed 
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in the case Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, which will be discussed below in the 
chapter on cases. 
5.5.2.2 Article 98(2) 
Art. 98(2) states an exception to surrender an accused person if it would 
require the requested state to act inconsistently with its obligations under an 
international agreement, be it bilateral or multilateral.
308
  During the Rome 
Conference the original intent was that an exception was required in relation 
to SOFA’s (Status of Forces Agreements), which are agreements often used 
by states that allow military activity by foreign troops on their territory.
309
 
And since most SOFA’s contain provisions governing the exercise of 
criminal jurisdiction over such troops, an exception in this context was 
deemed necessary. Since Art. 98(2) is not within the scope of the thesis, I 
will not address it further, but it will be briefly discussed below in chapter 6 
regarding challenges to the ICC.   
5.5.3 Cases 
5.5.3.1 Prosecutor v. Al Bashir 
The status of personal immunities of heads of state of non-party states in the 
event of a Chapter VII referral by the Security Council was tested in the case 
Prosecutor v. Al Bashir.
310
 On 31 March 2005 the UN Security Council, 
acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, passed Resolution 1593
311
 
which referred the situation in Darfur, Sudan, to the ICC. A Resolution was 
necessary since Sudan is not a party to the Rome Statute (and had not 
accepted ICC’s jurisdiction voluntarily). Thereafter, on 4 March 2009 and 
12 July 2010, the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC issued arrest warrants 
against Omar Al-Bashir, the serving president of Sudan, on account of 
crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide. Further, all state parties 
were sent a request for cooperation for the arrest and surrender of Al Bashir 
in accordance with Articles 89(1) and 91 of the Statute.  
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The decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber held that Al Bashir’s status as head 
of state was irrelevant, and was based on four conclusions.
 312
 First, it 
referred to the central aims of the Rome Statute to end impunity for the 
perpetrators of the most serious international crimes. Secondly, it stated that 
Article 27(2) applies to all people equally regardless of their position, even 
as head of state. Thirdly, it stated that customary international law rules 
establishing personal immunity is no bar to the Court for exercising its 
jurisdiction. Finally, it determined that the Security Council, in its referral, 
intended that any prosecution would take place within the framework of the 
Rome Statute.
313
 The removal of immunity would thereby make it possible 
to determine the individual criminal responsibility of Al Bashir, and provide 
a possibility to prosecute him for the alleged crimes once he was arrested. 
This illustrates the view of the ICC that personal immunities of heads of 
state of non-party states is not a bar to its jurisdiction.  
Another issue in this case arose after Al Bashir travelled to Malawi to 
participate in a summit of regional leaders on 14 October 2011. Malawi is a 
party to the Rome Statute, but did not arrest Al Bashir despite the request for 
cooperation circulated to all state parties by the ICC. In an explanation sent 
to the ICC, Malawi state officials explained that Art. 27 did not apply since 
Sudan was not a party to the Rome Statute, and that Al Bashir as serving 
head of state therefore was entitled to immunities and freedom from arrest 
and prosecution on Malawi territory.
314
 As a response, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber condemned Malawi for the failure to comply with the request to 
arrest and surrender Al Bashir to the ICC.
315
 This illustrates the view by the 
Court that the obligation to arrest leaders of non-party states set aside the 
customary rule of personal immunity which the state party normally is 
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obligated to respect. It could be argued that this view directly contradicts the 
wording in Art. 98(1). Whether it does so will be discussed further below. 
At this writing, Al Bashir is still not apprehended. Even so, the case is of 
great importance in order to determine how the ICC view its status and 
power to remove the personal immunity of heads of state of non-party states 
under a Chapter VII referral by the Security Council.  
5.5.3.2 Prosecutor v. Gaddafi 
The case Prosecutor v. Gaddafi
316
 is in several ways similar to the Al Bashir 
case. The UN Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, had referred the situation in Libya to the ICC by Resolution 
1970.
317
 On 27 June 2011, the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC authorised a 
warrant for the arrest of Muammar Gaddafi, the then serving president of 
Libya, which is not a party to the Rome Statute. By issuing the arrest 
warrant, the Pre-Trial Chamber determined that Art. 27(2) would be 
applicable to Gaddafi and effectively remove his right to invoke personal 
immunity, notwithstanding Libya’s status as a non-state party to the Rome 
Statute.
318
 In the decision, the Pre-Trial Chamber did not elaborate its 
reasoning on the issue of personal immunity, it merely made a reference to 
the decision in the Al Bashir case.  
However, the death of Gaddafi on 20 October 2011 closed the door on any 
prosecution of Gaddafi at the ICC. Following his death, the proceedings 
were terminated on 22 November 2011. Still, as in the case with Al Bashir, 
this case also illustrates how the ICC looks upon its power to remove the 
personal immunity of heads of state of non-party states.  
  
                                                                                                                            
(UNSC) and to the Assembly of the States Parties (ASP) to take the necessary measures they deem 
appropriate. http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/AlBashirEng.pdf (2015-05-25) 
316
 Prosecutor v. Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and 
Abdullah Al-Senussi, ICC-01/11-01/11. 
317
 UN Doc S/Res/1593 (26 February 2011) 
318
 Wardle, P., The Survival of Head of State Immunity at the International Criminal Court, 
AILJ (2011), p. 182. 
 77 
5.5.3.3 Prosecutor v. Gbagbo 
The case Prosecutor v. Gbagbo
319
 differentiates itself from the cases of Al 
Bashir and Gaddafi. On 23 November 2011, the Pre-Trial Chamber of the 
ICC issued a warrant for the arrest of Laurent Gbagbo, the serving president 
of Côte d’Ivoire. Gbagbo was transferred to the custody of the ICC on 30 
November 2011. Although Côte d’Ivoire is a party to the Rome Statute 
today, it was not at the time of the arrest warrant.
320
 However, Côte d’Ivoire 
had accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC on two previous occasions, on 18 
April 2003, and on 14 December 2010.
321
 The Prosecutor of the ICC was 
thereby authorized to exercise the proprio motu powers under Art. 12(3), in 
order to initiate an investigation. Further, such an acceptance of the 
jurisdiction of the ICC also makes Art. 27(2) applicable, thereby effectively 
revoking the immunity of Gbagbo under customary international law.
322
 
Consequently, by the acceptance of ICC’s jurisdiction and Art. 12(3) of the 
Statute, in combination with the removal of private immunity under Art. 
27(2), president Gbagbo’s head of state immunity has been abrogated. The 
trial is scheduled to open on 7 July 2015.
323
 
5.5.3.4 Prosecutor v. Kenyatta 
In the case Prosecutor v. Kenyatta,
324
 the president of the Republic of 
Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta, was investigated for crimes against humanity in the 
context of the 2007-2008 post-election violence in Kenya. Kenya is a state 
party to the Rome Statute.  On 31 March 2010, Pre-Trial Chamber had 
granted the Prosecution authorisation to open an investigation proprio motu 
in the situation of Kenya, and on 8 March 2011, Uhuru Kenyatta was 
summoned to appear before the Court.
325
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However, on 5 December 2014, the Office of the Prosecutor issued a public 
notice of withdrawal of the charges against Kenyatta.
326
 The notice stated 
that the Prosecution withdraws the charges against Mr Kenyatta since the 
evidence had not improved to such an extent that Mr Kenyatta’s alleged 
criminal responsibility could be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Following 
that, on 13 March 2015, the Trial Chamber of the ICC made public its 
decision to withdraw the charges against Kenyatta and terminate the 
proceedings.
327
 Even so, this case also illustrates that Art. 27(2) applies 
against serving heads of state of state parties to the Rome Statute. 
5.6 Analysis 
The indictments and arrest warrants in the cases against Al Bashir and 
Gaddafi, as well as the condemnation of Malawi in the Al Bashir case, have 
all been criticized.
328
 Some scholars agree with the outcome of the decision 
to issue the arrest warrants, but disagree with the reasoning of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber.
329
 Other scholars disagree with the outcome as well, and argue 
that a serving head of state of a non-state party is entitled to personal 
immunity, also before the ICC.
330
 The common denominator in their 
reasoning is that the ICC is based upon a treaty, the Rome Statute, which 
only can bind the contracting parties.  
In the Arrest Warrant case, the ICJ stated in the obiter dictum that the 
customary rule of personal immunity does not apply before international 
criminal courts. Akande concludes that whether personal immunity applies 
depends on the nature of the Court, how it was established and if the state of 
the official to be tried is bound by the instrument establishing the tribunal, 
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not the mere fact that it is an international court.
 331
 Because the ICC is 
based on a multilateral treaty, he argues, the ICC is not such a certain 
international criminal court with power to remove personal immunities of 
non-party states. Fox points out that the Rome Statute is a treaty like all 
others and enjoys no superiority over other conventions.
332
 The argument is 
that if two states cannot agree to remove the immunity of a third state, 
neither can sixty states.
333
 In comparison, the Statutes of the ICTY and the 
ICTR were created by Security Council Resolutions. The Statutes and their 
provisions are therefore authorized by Chapter VII as a response to a threat 
to international peace and security.
334
 Thereby, they become binding on all 
UN members and will therefore prevail over any obligations under 
customary international law.
335
 Despite this, Wardle argues that even though 
the situations in Darfur and Libya were referred to the ICC by the Security 
Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, that is not sufficient to 
remove the personal immunity of serving heads of state. In order for the 
personal immunity of Al Bashir and Gaddafi to be removed, Resolutions 
1593 and 1970 should have specified that explicitly.
336
  On the other hand, 
Gaeta argues that personal immunity of customary international law does 
not apply to the ICC, even when the state is a non-party member.
337
 In that 
respect, she agrees with the Court that the arrest warrant is not in conflict 
with the personal immunities of Al Bashir and Gaddafi. 
However, in situations when the Security Council has identified a threat to 
international peace and security, does it really matter whether it establishes an 
ad hoc tribunal such as the ICTY and ICTR or makes a referral of the situation 
to the ICC to handle the situation? It seems reasonable that the power does not 
rest with the Court or Tribunal in itself, but that it rests with the Security 
Council and Chapter VII of the UN Charter. As previously concluded, a 
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Security Council Resolution issued under Chapter VII has a higher hierarchy 
than international customary law (through the provisions of Art. 25 and Art. 
103 of the UN Charter). Therefore, as with the statutes of the ICTY and the 
ICTR, a referral by the Security Council must be said to give the ICC the 
necessary tools to exercise its jurisdiction under the Rome Statute in the 
referred situation. That includes Art. 27, which means that the customary rules 
of head of state immunity do not apply before the ICC.  If examined from that 
view, it is no longer relevant how the Court was created or whether the state is 
a party to the Statute. 
And by using the same logic, then all parties to the Rome Statute are also under 
an obligation to cooperate with the ICC under Art. 89 of the Rome Statute and 
arrest and surrender indicted heads of state of non-party states present on their 
territory. If so, the exceptions stated in Art. 98(1) does not apply when a 
situation has been referred to the ICC by the Security Council under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter. As concluded above, the obligation to follow Security 
Council Resolution requesting states to cooperate with the ICC has higher 
hierarchy than obligations to respect customary international law. And by that, 
one can conclude that it was correct of the Pre-Trial Chamber to condemn 
Malawi for not cooperating with the ICC and arrest Al Bashir during his visit. 
5.7 Conclusions 
It can be concluded that head of state immunity established by customary 
international law, which normally applies between states, can be set aside by a 
treaty like the Rome Statute. The functional immunity of former heads of state 
of state parties is effectively removed by Art. 27(1), and is consequently not 
applicable as a bar to the jurisdiction of the ICC. 
Further, by ratifying the Rome Statute, a state also agrees to the removal of 
personal immunity of its head of state before the ICC. If the head of state 
commits a crime under the jurisdiction of the court, Art. 27(2) will not prevent 
the Court from exercising its jurisdiction. This is confirmed by the case 
Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, even though the charges against Kenyatta were 
withdrawn. 
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The same applies in cases when non-party states have accepted the 
jurisdiction of the Court. By doing so, the state revokes the functional and 
personal immunity of its head of state. This is confirmed in the case 
Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, and is as well acknowledged in the legal literature 
used for this thesis. 
However, in cases where situations have been referred to the jurisdiction of 
the Court by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, the situation can be argued to be less clear. The cases Prosecutor v. 
Al Bashir and Prosecutor v. Gaddafi both support that personal immunity of 
a head of state of a non-party state is not a bar to the jurisdiction of the ICC 
under a referral by the Security Council. On the other hand, the arrest 
warrants against Al Bashir and Gaddafi have received a great deal of 
criticism, although some of the criticism regarded the reasoning and logic of 
the Pre-Trial Chamber more than the Arrest Warrant and non-applicability 
of the personal immunity in itself. In the humble opinion of this author, the 
Security Council’s Chapter VII referral to the ICC should be as authoritative 
as the creation of an ad hoc tribunal, and by such remove any possibility to 
remove personal immunity. And despite the criticism, it must still be 
concluded that all cases illustrate that Art. 27(2) removes the personal 
immunity, even for heads of state on non-party states.  
 82 
6 Final conclusions and 
reflections for the future 
As this thesis has shown, customary international law provides that serving 
heads of state enjoy both personal immunity and functional immunity before 
national courts of other states, even for private acts. This absolute immunity 
of a serving state official is illustrated by the Arrest Warrant case. Former 
heads of state are no longer of importance for the function of the state and 
do not enjoy personal immunity and the entailing extensive protection 
against the jurisdictions of foreign national courts. Still, functional immunity 
provides protection for acts attributable to the state, but not for private acts. 
As has been established, international crimes are not to be seen as private 
acts. Removal of the functional immunity of a former head of state in the 
case of a serious international crime is only possible with an exception to the 
customary rule providing immunity. This thesis argues that removal is only 
possible in case a convention establishes jurisdiction and removes the 
immunity. Such a convention is the 1984 Torture convention, as illustrated 
by the case Pinochet No. 3. Other conventions might also remove functional 
immunity, provided that it contains a provision of irrelevance of official 
capacity and provides for the exercise of jurisdiction. As a comparison, the 
1948 Genocide Convention contains a clause that removes functional 
immunity but recognises explicitly only territorial jurisdiction (or the 
jurisdiction of an international criminal tribunal). The conclusion is that 
foreign domestic courts provide some but still limited possibilities to fight 
impunity for heads of state responsible for international crimes. 
Ad hoc tribunals and international hybrid courts have proven to be more 
effective for prosecution of heads of state for serious international crimes, as 
shown in the cases Prosecutor v. Kambanda case and Prosecutor v. 
Milosevic. If the court or tribunal is established by a Security Council 
Resolution acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, both the personal 
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immunity of serving heads of state and the functional immunity of former 
heads of state are removed. Also, functional immunity does not apply before 
hybrid criminal courts. Personal immunity probably does still provide 
protection for serving heads of state before a hybrid criminal court. This is 
because the sufficient mandate to remove the customary rule of personal 
immunity of serving heads of state is lacking since they are not established 
under a Chapter VII provision, although the case Prosecutor v. Taylor 
suggest otherwise. That particular case has though been heavily criticised by 
many leading legal scholars. Even if the ad hoc tribunals and international 
hybrid courts can provide effective means of ending impunity, their 
jurisdiction is often limited to specific regions and to specific periods of 
time. Therefore, they are not available as a universal solution to ending 
impunity. 
In order to end impunity, the world is in need of a permanent international 
court, and by the establishment of the ICC in 2002, it got one. However, 
since the ICC is based on a treaty, the Rome Statute, it is also the result of 
compromises between the contracting states. Although it has the power to 
remove both functional immunity of former heads of state through Art 27(1) 
and personal immunity of serving heads of state through Art 27(2), its’ reach 
is still somewhat limited. States, by becoming parties to the Rome Statute, 
accept the jurisdiction of the ICC and the removal of any possibility to 
invoke immunity. But the jurisdiction of the ICC is from the starting point 
limited to the principles of territoriality and active personality of the state 
parties. The back-up is the possibility of the Security Council to refer 
situations to the ICC. Under such referrals, since the Security Council is 
acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the ICC has universal 
jurisdiction. Despite the fact that the Court is based on the Rome Statute, 
such a referral authorizes the ICC to put serving heads of state of non-party 
states on trial and also to remove their personal immunity. This power to 
remove the personal immunity of heads of state of non-parties is illustrated 
by the cases Prosecutor v. Al Bashir and Prosecutor v. Gaddafi. However, 
there are still some limitations to the ICC. The principle of complementarity 
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establishes that a case is only admissible to the ICC if the state is unwilling 
or unable to genuinely investigate or prosecute. The principle applies even 
after a Security Council referral. Although a case becomes admissible to the 
ICC in the case of improper investigations and sham trials, it still limits the 
power and effectiveness of the ICC in the fight against impunity.  
Furthermore, it should be noted that the ICC is facing some other 
challenges. 
As an example, even though the numbers of parties to the Rome Statute at 
this writing has increased to 123 states, the universal jurisdiction of the 
Court, which is a prerequisite for the end to impunity, still requires the 
cooperation of the Security Council. In this context, it is problematic that the 
U.S., China and Russia, i.e. three of the five permanent members of the 
Security Council, have chosen not to become parties to the Rome Statute. In 
fact, they have taken quite offensive attitudes towards the ICC, especially 
the U.S. An example is the well-known bilateral “non-surrender 
agreements” that the U.S. has concluded with many state parties to the Rome 
Statute in order to shield U.S. nationals from being surrendered to the ICC. 
The U.S. has taken the view that such agreements are compatible with Art. 
98(2) of the Rome Statute and would prevent the contracting states from 
cooperating with the ICC. It should however be noted that such agreements 
do not affect the jurisdiction of the ICC if a U.S. national in fact was 
prosecuted. Still, it might be considered problematic that the competence of 
the ICC depends on a large number of signatories or on a Security Council 
Referral, which can only be achieved in certain situations where the 
permanent members of the Security Council agree, but will be impossible in 
others because of their veto power. In this perspective, one has to conclude 
that a Chapter VII referral most likely never will take place for any of the 
five permanent members or their “allies”. 
Instead, all the ongoing situations under investigations at the ICC are of 
African origin; The Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, the Central 
African Republic, Sudan (Darfur), Kenya, Libya, Côte d’Ivoire and Mali. 
The African Union has delivered sharp criticism against this and raised 
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allegations that the ICC is only a court for Africa. In fact, the African Union 
has expressed that its members should refuse cooperation with the ICC in 
accordance with Art. 98 of the Rome Statute, even if they are parties to the 
Statute. Several of them, such as Malawi in the Al Bashir case, have 
disregarded requests of cooperation from the Court, even if they are parties 
to the Rome Statute. 
Furthermore, in what can be interpreted as a response to the ICC’s focus on 
African situations, the member states of the African Union on 1 July 2008 
decided to create the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR), 
through a merger of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights 
(AfCHPR) and the African Court of Justice (ACJ).
338
 Although not yet 
functional, the main purpose of the court will be to serve as the principal 
judicial organ of the African Union. It will be authorized to try individuals 
accused of crimes against humanity and other serious international crimes. It 
is clear that at least serving heads of state will be able to invoke personal 
immunity when the Court becomes operational, which is a blow to the fight 
against impunity. During a summit in July 2014 the African Union adopted 
an amendment to the Statute of the ACJHR, which declares: 
“No charges shall be commenced or continued before the Court against any serving AU 
Head of State or Government, or anybody acting or entitled to act in such capacity, or 
other senior state officials based on their functions, during their tenure of office.“339 
This is of course unfortunate in the fight against impunity, and the immunity 
provision is in fact in conflict with the African Unions Constitutive Act, 
which rejects impunity under Article 4.
340
 By adopting the provision, the 
leaders of the states of the African Union have declared that personal 
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inviolability is of greater importance than personal accountability. It should 
however be noted that the ACJHR will not affect the ICC’s ability to try 
heads of state. The ICC will still be able to exercise its jurisdiction and the 
Security Council will still be able to refer situations to the ICC. The 
criticism of the African Union does however entail a risk that African states 
might wish to withdraw from the Rome Statute. As an example, Kenya 
threatened to do so in 2013 when their president Uhuru Kenyatta was 
charged by the ICC, as described in the Kenyatta case. Kenya is still a party 
to the Rome Statute, but that might be on account of the fact that the charges 
against Kenyatta were eventually dropped. 
In summary, it is clear that the ICC is probably not the end to impunity that 
the world hoped for when it was first established, and it is apparent that 
there are challenges ahead. It should however be noted that the ICC is now 
conducting preliminary examinations in several states outside of Africa, 
such as Afghanistan, Colombia, Georgia, Honduras, Iraq, Ukraine and 
Palestine. The future will tell whether any investigations will be initiated, 
but if they do it will hopefully mitigate the criticism from the African Union 
and ensure that the ICC is an international criminal court for the whole 
international society. 
To answer the question raised in the introduction of this thesis, it is clear 
that heads of state in 2015 still can commit serious crimes against 
international law and be granted impunity. However, since the end of the 
last millennium important steps against impunity have still been taken. As 
this thesis has shown, several heads of state have actually been held 
responsible for their actions during this time period. Also, change does not 
happen overnight, and the development in humanitarian law is progressing. 
It was stated in the Arrest Warrant case that the law “is in constant 
evolution, with a discernible trend to limiting immunity and strengthening 
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accountability”.341  This indicates that there might be a definitive end to 
impunity in the future. But we are not there yet. 
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